Scherer v. Volusia County Department of Corrections
171 So. 3d 135
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Brian Scherer, a correctional officer, was diagnosed with cardiomyopathy, stopped work in Oct. 2009, returned Apr. 2010, retired Jan. 27, 2012, and received a heart transplant in Mar. 2013.
- Scherer filed five consolidated workers’ compensation petitions in 2013 alleging compensable "disablement" on Oct. 29, 2009 and Jan. 27, 2012, relying on the statutory presumption in §112.18(1)(a) (the "heart-lung" presumption).
- Volusia County argued Scherer was ineligible for the presumption because he did not make a claim prior to or within 180 days after leaving employment as required by §112.18(1)(b)4 (added effective Jan. 1, 2011).
- The Judge of Compensation Claims held the 180-day requirement barred Scherer from the presumption for both dates, interpreting the statute to make the filing date (claims filed on/after July 1, 2010) determinative.
- The First District reversed: it construed the clause "occurring on or after July 1, 2010" to refer to dates of accident/disablement (not filing) and held Scherer is entitled to the presumption for the Oct. 29, 2009 disablement (pre-July 1, 2010) but not for the Jan. 27, 2012 disablement (post-July 1, 2010).
Issues
| Issue | Scherer’s Argument | Volusia County’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the July 1, 2010 qualifier in §112.18(1)(b) apply to all subparagraphs of (b) including (b)4? | The entire paragraph (b) — including the 180‑day rule in (b)4 — applies only to disablements occurring on/after July 1, 2010. | The July 1, 2010 language modifies only (b)1 and not (b)4; (b)4’s 180‑day rule applies irrespective of date of disablement. | The court held the July 1, 2010 qualifier applies to all subparts of (b); (b)4 does not independently apply to pre‑July 1, 2010 disablements. |
| Is the relevant date the date the claim is filed or the date the injury/disablement "occurs"? | "Occurring" refers to disablement/injury date; thus the effective date turns on date of disablement. | The statute should be read to make the filing date determinative for claims filed on/after July 1, 2010. | The court held the word "occurring" must be given effect; date of disablement (occurrence) is determinative. |
| Did Scherer lose the presumption for his Oct. 29, 2009 disablement because he did not file within 180 days after leaving employment? | No — the 180‑day rule in (b)4 does not apply to disablements occurring before July 1, 2010, so the presumption remains for the 2009 disablement. | Yes — Scherer did not make any claim within 180 days after separating and thus is ineligible. | The court held Scherer is entitled to the presumption for the 2009 disablement and reversed as to that date; the presumption does not apply to the 2012 disablement. |
| What remedy? | Remand for evidence on occupational causation where the presumption applies. | N/A | The court remanded for proof as to causation (presumption is rebuttable). |
Key Cases Cited
- Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (establishing legislative presumption that certain heart disease in firefighters/correctional officers is job‑related)
- Walters v. State, DOC/Div. of Risk Mgmt., 100 So.3d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (describing §112.18 presumption as dispositive unless rebutted)
- Hoppe v. City of Lakeland, 691 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (in occupational‑disease cases, compensability turns on date of disablement)
- Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 2003) (advocating common‑sense statutory interpretation to effect legislative intent)
- Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2006) (statutory construction requires avoiding surplusage; give effect to every word)
- Seminole County Sheriffs Office v. Johnson, 901 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (treating certain amendments to §112.18 as procedural and retroactive in prior context)