Schenk, Stephanie Ann
PD-0664-15
| Tex. App. | Jun 4, 2015Background
- March 7, 2012: Plano Officer Michael White stopped a car for traffic violations; three occupants were ordered out and seated on the curb while the officer called for backup and ran license checks.
- Officer White frisked/inspected occupants, asked group questions about drug use and prior arrests, and separated the driver for questioning.
- Officer White located a marijuana pipe in the back seat; thereafter he asked Schenk (front passenger) if she had anything in her purse.
- Schenk first denied, then admitted she had something in the purse and said "I don't care" when the officer asked to retrieve it; a search of the purse produced a baggie that field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
- Schenk moved to suppress arguing (1) Miranda warnings were required, (2) the stop was unlawfully prolonged, (3) her consent to search was involuntary, and (4) the trial court’s Cullen findings were inadequate. The trial court denied suppression; Schenk pleaded guilty and appealed.
- The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed: it held Schenk was not in Miranda custody, she waived or failed to preserve the prolonged‑detention claim, the purse search was lawful under vehicle probable‑cause precedent, and the trial court’s Cullen findings were sufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Schenk's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Schenk was "in custody" for Miranda when questioned and when purse was searched | Officer’s conduct (ordering out, guarding with drawn hand near weapon, separate questioning, accusatory drug questions) made a reasonable person feel as under arrest; therefore Miranda warnings were required | Routine traffic stop facts and group questioning did not create custody; occupants outnumbered officers and there was no formal arrest or coercive show of force | Not in custody for Miranda; confession and consent admissible |
| Whether the stop was impermissibly prolonged beyond the time to handle the traffic matter | Warrants/ checks cleared; any further delay to conduct a drug investigation unlawfully prolonged the seizure — Rodriguez (2015) controls on prolongation | Issue not preserved at trial (not raised specifically); even on merits the court found detention not impermissibly prolonged | Waived/ not preserved; rejected on appeal |
| Whether Schenk’s consent to search her purse was voluntary | Consent was tainted by the detention and coercion; prosecution must prove consent was freely and voluntarily given | Officer had probable cause from pipe with residue in car, enabling search of containers in vehicle without individualized consent (Houghton) | Search lawful under vehicle‑probable‑cause rule; voluntariness need not be reached |
| Whether the trial court’s findings complied with State v. Cullen | Trial court’s findings and conclusions contain unsupported or conclusory factual statements and thus do not provide an adequate appellate record per Cullen | Trial court entered 57 findings; Schenk did not identify any omitted essential dispositive finding required by Cullen | Cullen satisfied — findings adequate for appellate review |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limits search‑incident‑to‑arrest in vehicle context and addresses when vehicle searches are permissible)
- State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Miranda custody test: whether a reasonable person would perceive restraint comparable to formal arrest)
- State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (trial court must state essential findings on suppression requests)
- Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (probable cause to search a vehicle extends to containers belonging to passengers)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (officer may not prolong a traffic stop to conduct unrelated investigatory procedures absent reasonable suspicion)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (scope of detention must be tailored to its purpose; consent tainted by illegal detention may be invalid)
- United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a person is not free to leave if police retain identity documents such as a driver’s license)