Schaub v. Schaub
305 P.3d 337
Alaska2013Background
- Gaylord (Hank) and Theresa Schaub divorced by final decree in November 1992; the decree expressly left property issues unresolved and stated it did not bar future action on unresolved issues.
- Hank served >22 years in the U.S. military and has received military retirement pay since about 2002–2003; Theresa has an Anchorage School District pension.
- Theresa moved in 2010 for post-decree equitable division of property under AS 25.24.160(a)(4); earlier (June 2010) she had filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the decree for alleged fraud, which was denied as untimely.
- Hank opposed the post-decree motion, asserting it was time‑barred by the statute of limitations, and alternatively barred by laches and estoppel; he sought summary judgment which the superior court denied.
- After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court held: statute of limitations did not bar Theresa’s motion; laches barred retrospective recovery before June 15, 2010 but not prospective relief; it awarded Theresa 50% of the marital portion of Hank’s retirement benefits beginning June 15, 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed in part but remanded to change the effective date to the hearing date (August 11, 2011).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Theresa) | Defendant's Argument (Hank) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AS 25.24.160(a)(4) permits post‑decree motion to divide property | Statute authorizes division "at any time after judgment" and she filed a motion to adjudicate unresolved property issues | Divorce decree silent on property does not remove statute of limitations or permit unlimited delay | Court: AS 25.24.160(a)(4) allows post‑decree motions to divide property when decree left issues unresolved (affirmed) |
| Whether statute of limitations bars the post‑decree motion | Motion is not a new action commencing suit; statutes of limitations apply to commencing actions, not to motions within an existing case | Characterize the motion as an "independent action" subject to AS 09.10.070/100 (2‑yr or 10‑yr limits) | Court: Statute of limitations does not apply to this post‑judgment motion (affirmed) |
| Whether laches bars Theresa’s entire claim for portion of retirement | Laches can be applied to discrete payments; equitable to allow prospective division from notice date | Laches is a complete defense to the entire claim given decades of delay and prejudice to Hank | Court: Laches may bar retrospective relief but not necessarily the entire claim; partial bar appropriate (affirmed as to prospectivity) |
| Proper effective date for dividing retirement benefits | Division should begin when court has jurisdiction to allocate existing, non‑expended assets (i.e., date of hearing/order) | Superior court used June 15, 2010 (Rule 60(b) filing) as cut‑off; Hank had spent benefits after that date | Court: It was error to set June 15, 2010 as the start date; division must be prospective from the date of the property‑division hearing (remanded to set August 11, 2011) |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Brocklin v. Van Brocklin, 635 P.2d 1186 (Alaska 1981) (post‑judgment statutory power to adjudicate property when decree silent)
- State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Dean, 902 P.2d 1321 (Alaska 1995) (statutes of limitations apply to commencing actions, i.e., filing complaints)
- Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989) (laches may bar only part of a claim; treat each payment as separate wrongful act)
- Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (assets that no longer exist at time of trial are not available for distribution)
- Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680 (Alaska 2010) (marital assets spent after separation for normal living expenses are typically not included in final division)
- Thomas v. Thomas, 815 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1991) (retaining jurisdiction to divide future‑vested pensions is an accepted approach)
- Beltran v. Razo, 788 P.2d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (court may deny retroactivity yet award division prospectively from petition date)
- Foster v. State, 752 P.2d 459 (Alaska 1988) (laches barred retrospective relief where plaintiff delayed despite public record; distinguished on facts)