380 F. Supp. 3d 106
D. Mass.2019Background
- In 1986 Mark Schand was convicted for the murder of Victoria Seymour after multiple eyewitness identifications; he served ~27 years before a 2013 motion for new trial was allowed and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the case.
- Investigative record contains mixed and inconsistent identifications, Hartford-sourced Polaroid photos of Schand (with sunglasses and chains), and mugshots; dispute whether Polaroids were shown to Springfield witnesses before Schand’s arrest.
- Key arguable misconduct alleged: use of suggestive photo arrays/Polaroid, a potentially doctored two-page police report (the “Scammons Report”) with an omitted second page, suppression of Hartford investigative material, and witness inducements/recantations.
- Plaintiffs sued Springfield and five former Springfield detectives under § 1983 and Massachusetts law asserting claims including unduly suggestive identification (Due Process), suppression/fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, Monell failure-to-train, and various state torts.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment (one motion by McMahon, one by remaining defendants) and moved to strike a 2006 affidavit from now-deceased witness Michael Hosten alleging police coercion and suggestive use of a Polaroid.
- The district court (Ponsor, J.): denied the motion to strike without prejudice; allowed summary judgment in large part but denied it as to (inter alia) Count I (improper identification), Count VI (conspiracy § 1983), and Count XI (common-law malicious prosecution) as to Scammons, Muise, and Reid; granted summary judgment for Assad and largely for McMahon except on Counts I, VI, XI.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Hosten affidavit (motion to strike) | Hosten’s post-conviction affidavit describes police coercion and use of Polaroid; it supports suggestiveness/ fabrication claims | Defendants: affidavit is unauthenticated, hearsay, unwitnessed, contradicts prior sworn testimony, likely inadmissible | Court denied motion to strike without prejudice (admissibility left to trial judge); affidavit not outcome-determinative on summary judgment |
| Monell failure-to-train (City liability) | City training/policies were inadequate and caused constitutional violations | City: training not so deficient; no pattern of prior violations to put city on notice; misconduct was deliberate by officers, not training-caused | Summary judgment for City allowed: no evidence city’s training was moving force or on notice of constitutional effects |
| Qualified immunity for malicious prosecution and failure-to-intercede (§ 1983 Counts IV, V) | Plaintiffs: officers caused prosecution; failed to intercede | Defendants: qualified immunity; at time (1986) law on § 1983 malicious prosecution unclear; duty to intercede not clearly established outside excessive-force context | Summary judgment for defendants on Counts IV and V (qualified immunity) |
| Improper identification procedures (Count I) | Police used suggestive procedures (Polaroids mixed with mugshots, suggestive arrays, lineup problems) that tainted IDs | Defendants: deny showing Polaroids pre-arrest; argue collateral estoppel/limitations/qualified immunity inapplicable | Summary judgment denied as to Counts I for Scammons, Muise, Reid, McMahon — triable issues of fact about use of Polaroids and suggestiveness |
| Suppression of exculpatory evidence / fabrication (Counts II & III against McMahon) | McMahon suppressed Hartford material and doctored Scammons Report (page removal) | McMahon: collateral estoppel from prior state/federal proceedings; no evidence tying him to alteration or concealment | Summary judgment for McMahon on Counts II & III (claims precluded by collateral estoppel and insufficient evidence tying McMahon to misconduct) |
| State-law torts and statute of limitations / MTCA presentment (Counts XII–XVIII, XIII, XIV, XVIII) | Plaintiffs seek state tort recovery for conspiracy, negligence, IIED, consortium, respondeat superior | Defendants: many state claims time-barred; MTCA presentment required and not timely; some counts precluded by statute of limitations or MTCA | Summary judgment for defendants on many state-law counts: presentment/limitations bars and Heck-type tolling concerns (court declines to extend tolling; state-law tolling left to SJC) |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires a policy, custom, or deliberate indifference)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (failure-to-train municipal liability standard; deliberate indifference requirement)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (accrual rule for § 1983 claims attacking conviction)
- Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (due-process analysis of eyewitness identification reliability)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (status of § 1983 malicious-prosecution theory discussed)
- Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009) (qualified-immunity analysis steps)
- Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) (municipal liability requires notice/past violations showing unconstitutional effects)
- Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1989) (malicious prosecution and municipal training discussion)
- Johnson v. Mahoney, 424 F.3d 83 (collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of suppression/suppression-of-exculpatory-evidence issues)