246 So. 3d 253
Fla.2018Background
- Eric Kurt Patrick was convicted in 2009 of kidnapping, robbery, and first-degree murder; jury recommended death 7–5 and trial court imposed death; conviction affirmed on direct appeal (Patrick v. State).
- Postconviction Rule 3.851 motion raised multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel (Miranda waiver/confession, shoeprint evidence, mitigation investigation, juror bias) and later added a Hurst-related claim.
- The postconviction court denied relief (some after evidentiary hearing, some summarily) and treated Patrick’s Hurst claim as premature pending this Court’s retroactivity decisions.
- While postconviction litigation was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida and this Court interpreted Hurst to require unanimous jury findings for death (Hurst v. State); this Court later held Hurst retroactive to defendants whose sentences became final after Ring.
- This Court (per curiam) affirmed denial of most postconviction claims, reversed as to one juror-bias ineffective-assistance claim and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but granted habeas relief under Hurst, vacated Patrick’s death sentence, and remanded for a new penalty phase.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Patrick is entitled to relief under Hurst (habeas) | Hurst requires jury unanimity on aggravators and Patrick’s 7–5 recommendation violates Hurst; Hurst is retroactive to him | State argued error was not necessarily prejudicial or that retroactivity issues precluded relief at that stage | Granted habeas; death sentence vacated; new penalty phase ordered under Hurst (Hurst retroactive to Patrick) |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Miranda waiver/confession based on alleged cocaine withdrawal | Counsel should have consulted psychopharmacologist; withdrawal + mental health made waiver/in-custodial statements involuntary | Video and expert testimony did not show incapacity; statements were coherent, responsive, and waiver was knowing; challenge would be meritless | Denied; counsel not ineffective because suppression motion would have failed; waiver and confession valid |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not seeking Frye hearing / attacking shoeprint evidence | New FBI research undermines shoeprint reliability; counsel should have challenged admissibility or credibility | Shoeprint comparison was not novel under Frye; counsel strategically conceded presence at scene and declined to expend resources on this challenge | Denied; Frye hearing would have been denied and counsel’s strategic decision was reasonable and not prejudicial |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not striking/questioning a juror biased against homosexuality | Juror stated he would be biased if perpetrator perceived as homosexual and that bias could affect deliberations | State argued bias was not defense-specific and counsel may have had strategic reasons; voir dire showed other juror answers were not disqualifying | Reverse & remand for evidentiary hearing limited to juror’s statements about homosexuality bias; other juror-related claims moot or denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Patrick v. State, 104 So.3d 1046 (Fla. 2012) (direct-appeal opinion summarizing facts, aggravators, mitigation, and sentence)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (Supreme Court holding Florida’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Sixth Amendment)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida decision requiring jury unanimity on aggravators, sufficiency, and weighing)
- Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2016) (holding Hurst retroactive to defendants whose sentences became final after Ring)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (holding judicial factfinding that increases punishment must be found by a jury)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test)
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless-error standard requiring state to prove error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Carratelli v. State, 961 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2007) (standard for showing juror actual bias)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986) (mental condition alone insufficient to render confession involuntary)