& SC15-297 Donald Lenneth Banks v. State of Florida and Donald Lenneth Banks v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
219 So. 3d 19
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Donald Lenneth Banks was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2005 stabbing death of Linda Volum and sentenced to death after a 10–2 jury recommendation.
- Physical and forensic evidence tied Banks to the scene: his blood and semen were found, a knife and crack pipe were recovered, a bare footprint of his was in blood, and an unidentified bloody print indicated another person may have been present; surveillance showed Banks driving the victim’s car with another person.
- Banks made inculpatory statements to his girlfriend Sudie Johnson (e.g., “I just murked somebody,” and later admitting to facts known only to a participant or investigators); Johnson cooperated with police and consented to a second search of the shared residence.
- On direct appeal, this Court affirmed conviction and sentence; Banks later filed a Rule 3.851 motion and a habeas petition raising multiple ineffective-assistance and trial-error claims.
- The postconviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing; this appeal affirms denial of guilt-phase claims and habeas, but finds Hurst error in sentencing and vacates the death sentence, remanding for a new penalty phase.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Banks) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of consent to second search | Johnson’s consent was coerced; counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress | Johnson voluntarily consented to the second search at station and accompanied police; a suppression motion would be meritless | Consent to the second search was voluntary; counsel not ineffective — claim denied |
| Admission of DNA without population statistics | Counsel ineffective for not objecting to DNA admitted without match-frequency statistics | Counsel strategically avoided presenting a 1-in-56 quadrillion statistic; expert explained match significance to jury | Strategic decision reasonable; counsel not ineffective and claim denied |
| Cross-examining Johnson’s motive / impeachment (including letters, felony, cashier witness) | Counsel was ineffective for lines of questioning and for failing to use impeachment evidence/witnesses | Counsel’s approaches were strategic (to avoid harmful testimony or to impeach); many points were already elicited or would have been neutral/harmful | No deficiency or no prejudice shown; claims denied |
| Prosecutorial comments | Prosecutor improperly argued sexual battery, attacked Johnson, and referenced felonies; counsel ineffective for not objecting | Comments were proper in context, within evidence and fair inference; objections would be meritless | Comments not improper in context; counsel not ineffective — claim denied |
| Appellate counsel on principals instruction (habeas) | Appellate counsel ineffective for not challenging principal instruction | Instruction had factual support (unidentified bloody print, surveillance, Banks’ admissions referencing “Bo”) | Instruction justified by record; appellate counsel not ineffective — habeas denied |
| Hurst challenge to death sentence | Jury’s 10–2 recommendation violates Hurst; sentencing error not harmless | State must show error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Hurst error not harmless given 10–2 recommendation; death sentence vacated and remanded for new penalty phase |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent to search judged under totality of circumstances)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-error standard placing burden on State)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (jury unanimity and fact-finding requirements for death sentences)
- Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151 (Florida application of Strickland and deference to strategic choices)