& SC14-22 Roderick Michael Orme v. State of Florida and Roderick Michael Orme v. Julie L. Jones, etc.

In 1992 Orme was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and robbery; a jury recommended death 7–5 and the trial judge imposed death based on three aggravators (pecuniary gain; murder during sexual battery; HAC).
After successive appeals and postconviction proceedings, Orme received a new penalty phase in 2007; a new jury recommended death 11–1 and the trial court again imposed death.
Orme filed a 3.851 postconviction motion raising ineffective-assistance and related claims; the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on one claim but ultimately denied relief. Orme appealed and petitioned for habeas relief.
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida (jury must find the facts necessary for death), Orme sought supplemental briefing asserting Hurst error given the 11–1 penalty recommendation.
The Florida Supreme Court held Hurst applies to Orme and reviewed whether the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; because the jury vote was 11–1, the court concluded it could not determine which aggravators a unanimous jury would have found and that the error was not harmless.
Result: Orme’s death sentence was vacated and the case remanded for a new penalty phase; the court did not address Orme’s other postconviction or habeas claims.

Issue	Orme's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Does Hurst v. Florida apply to Orme’s sentence?	Hurst requires a new sentence because jury did not unanimously find the facts necessary for death.	(Implicit) Hurst should not disturb Orme’s sentence or is inapplicable.	Hurst applies; court followed Hurst v. State and Mosley retroactivity analysis and applied Hurst to Orme.
Was the Hurst error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?	No — an 11–1 recommendation prevents knowing whether any aggravator would have been found unanimously.	The State bears the burden to show no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the sentence.	Not harmless; the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a unanimous jury would have found all facts necessary for death.
What relief is appropriate if Hurst error is established?	New penalty phase (resentencing) because jury findings were defective.	(Implicit) Death sentence should stand if harmless or procedural bars apply.	Vacated death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase.
Should other postconviction and habeas claims be decided now?	Orme raised multiple ineffective-assistance and habeas claims accompanying the Hurst claim.	State would oppose relief on those other claims.	Court declined to address other claims because Hurst relief was dispositive of resentencing issues.

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (Sixth Amendment requires jury findings of facts necessary to impose death)
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Hurst requiring unanimous jury findings on aggravators, sufficiency, and weighing)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (jury must find aggravating factors necessary for death)
DiGuilio v. State, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (harmless-error standard focusing on whether error had a reasonable possibility of affecting the result)
Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996) (direct appeal opinion detailing facts and initial sentencing)
Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2005) (postconviction ruling ordering a new penalty phase for ineffective assistance re bipolar disorder)
Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2009) (resentencing direct-appeal decision affirming death sentence after new penalty phase)