& SC14-1266 & SC14-1305 Lewis Brooke Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & The Plantation at Ponte Vedra v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. & Gideon M.G. Gratsiani v. U.S. Bank National Association, etc.
211 So. 3d 1009
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Bartram obtained a $650,000 residential mortgage (standard form) with an optional acceleration clause and an express reinstatement provision; maturity date 2035.
- Bartram defaulted on payments beginning in January 2006; the bank filed a foreclosure complaint in May 2006 seeking acceleration of the debt.
- The foreclosure action was involuntarily dismissed under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) in May 2011; no final judgment foreclosing the mortgage was entered.
- Bartram later sought declaratory relief/quiet title claiming the five-year statute of limitations barred any subsequent foreclosure based on later defaults.
- The trial court granted Bartram summary judgment canceling the mortgage; the Fifth District reversed and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court about whether acceleration in the dismissed suit triggered the statute of limitations against later foreclosure for new defaults.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bartram) | Defendant's Argument (U.S. Bank) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether acceleration in a dismissed foreclosure starts the 5‑year SOL for the entire accelerated debt so as to bar later foreclosure on subsequent defaults | Acceleration in the first suit caused the cause of action to accrue and the SOL to run on the whole debt; Bank failed to revoke acceleration, so later suits are time‑barred | Dismissal revoked acceleration (returned parties to installment status); SOL runs separately from each subsequent default, so bank may foreclose on defaults within 5 years | No — dismissal revokes pretrial acceleration; subsequent defaults create new causes of action and SOL runs from those defaults; bank may bring later foreclosure if based on defaults within 5 years |
| Effect of involuntary dismissal (Rule 1.420(b)) on acceleration/reinstatement | Dismissal does not automatically decelerate; absent evidence of reinstatement, borrower still owes accelerated balance and SOL may bar later suits | Involuntary dismissal (with or without prejudice) returns parties to pre‑foreclosure contractual relationship; reinstatement provision preserves borrower’s right to cure and installment status until final judgment | Dismissal revokes acceleration and restores installment status (particularly where mortgage contains reinstatement right); dismissal type (with/without prejudice) is immaterial for this rule |
| Whether Singleton (res judicata context) applies to statute of limitations issues in foreclosure | Singleton should not be extended beyond res judicata; applying it to SOL undermines statutory scheme and requires factual proof of reinstatement | Singleton’s reasoning (each new default is a separate cause of action) applies equally to SOL; courts have so held | Singleton’s reasoning applies: each separate, subsequent default yields a new accrual for SOL purposes |
| Role of mortgage reinstatement clause in post‑dismissal enforcement | Reinstatement clause requires compliance with specific conditions; court shouldn’t assume automatic reinstatement without evidence | Reinstatement clause supports restoring installment character after dismissal and protects borrower’s cure rights until final judgment | Reinstatement clause reinforces that installment status continues until final judgment and borrower may cure; dismissal without final judgment negates the alleged acceleration |
Key Cases Cited
- Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 2004) (holding a subsequent foreclosure based on a separate default is not necessarily barred by res judicata)
- Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So.3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (applying Singleton to hold installment nature continues post‑acceleration where mortgage contains reinstatement right)
- Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (reasoning that dismissal of foreclosure does not necessarily bar a subsequent action on later defaults)
- Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Brown, 175 So.3d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (noting a mortgage note remains an obligation for total principal and installments do not eliminate ongoing liability)