& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. and City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311

Background

Bradley Westphal, a St. Petersburg firefighter, suffered a severe on‑the‑job spinal injury and received temporary total disability (TTD) and medical benefits under Fla. Stat. ch. 440.
Section 440.15(2)(a) (2009) limited TTD to 104 weeks or until maximum medical improvement (MMI), whichever occurred earlier; Westphal had not reached MMI at 104 weeks and remained totally disabled.
After 104 weeks Westphal sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits but the JCC denied relief because PTD is generally ripe only after MMI (creating a "statutory gap").
A First District panel declared the 104‑week limit unconstitutional as applied and awarded up to 260 weeks; the en banc First District reversed by construing the statute to deem workers at MMI when TTD expires.
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the en banc decision, held the plain statutory language creates a gap, and ruled the 104‑week limit unconstitutional as applied to workers like Westphal for denying access to courts; it revived the pre‑1994 260‑week limit as the remedy.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Westphal)	Defendant's Argument (City/State)	Held
Whether the First DCA en banc construction (deeming TTD‑expiry workers at MMI) is a permissible saving construction	Westphal argued no judicial rewrite is permitted; statute should be applied as written and is unconstitutional as applied	City/State argued the en banc construction reasonably avoids unconstitutionality	Court: En banc construction impermissibly rewrites plain statute; quashed
Whether § 440.15(2)(a)’s 104‑week TTD cap, as applied to workers still totally disabled but pre‑MMI, violates art. I, § 21 (access to courts)	Westphal: 104‑week cap cuts off benefits indefinitely and abolishes any reasonable alternative to tort remedies for severely injured workers	City/State: Legislature restructured, not abolished, remedies; policy choices are legislative	Court: As applied to similarly situated workers, the 104‑week limit denies access to courts and is unconstitutional
Appropriate remedy for the unconstitutional application of § 440.15(2)(a)	Westphal sought relief up to revival of prior law or prospective relief	City/State proposed the en banc construction as a fix	Court: Revive pre‑1994 260‑week TTD limitation (statutory revival), leaving rest of ch. 440 intact
Whether the workers’ compensation scheme as a whole is invalid	Westphal and amici suggested broader invalidation; concurrence urged comprehensive legislative fix	City/State did not seek wholesale invalidation	Court: Declined to invalidate entire scheme; limited ruling is as‑applied and remedy is revival of 260 weeks

Key Cases Cited

Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (access‑to‑courts test: legislature may not abolish pre‑existing redress without reasonable alternative or overwhelming necessity)
Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1991) (upheld workers’ comp reductions earlier; articulated that scheme must remain reasonable alternative to tort)
Mullarkey v. Fla. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1972) (workers’ compensation as a system of compensation without contest)
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So.3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (First DCA en banc decision construing statute to avoid gap; later quashed)
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (held PTD generally requires proof disability will exist after MMI; recognized statutory gap)
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So.3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reaffirmed Oswald; discussed gap and conflicting interpretations)
Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1978) (courts may not rewrite plainly written statutes to save them)
B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1994) (statutory revival principle when a later enactment is struck down)
Corral v. McCrory Corp., 228 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1969) (MMI marks end of temporary disability and start of permanent disability)