190 So. 3d 1012
Fla.2016Background
- June 1994 triple homicide at Casmir Sucharski’s home; surveillance video captured two intruders; frames from the tape were used to identify suspects.
- Pablo Ibar was arrested after a tip and tried separately; conviction for three counts of first‑degree murder and death sentences were affirmed on direct appeal (Ibar v. State).
- No physical evidence connected Ibar to the murders: DNA and hairs from a blue T‑shirt found at the scene did not match Ibar.
- The State’s case relied heavily on a grainy surveillance videotape and witness identifications distilled from still frames; identification was the linchpin of the prosecution’s case.
- Trial counsel Kayo Morgan failed to present a facial‑identification/forensic anthropologist expert (despite prior use of such an expert in a codefendant’s trials), and admitted numerous personal and professional impairments during trial.
- Postconviction court denied relief; the Florida Supreme Court reversed that denial and remanded for a new trial, concluding counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudice established.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ibar) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance by failing to present a facial‑identification expert | Morgan’s failure to retain/present a facial‑identification or forensic anthropologist was deficient and not strategic; such an expert would have undermined the video identification | The jury saw the video and had other identifications (e.g., Gary Foy); even with an expert, outcome likely unchanged | Held for Ibar: counsel deficient; new trial ordered |
| Whether Ibar was prejudiced by counsel’s omission under Strickland’s prejudice prong | Expert testimony would have shown the surveillance images were too poor for reliable ID, and highlighted discrepancies between Ibar and the perpetrator, undermining confidence in the verdict | Expert opinions were inconclusive; experts could not definitively exclude Ibar; evidence (video, Foy’s ID) still persuasive | Held for Ibar: prejudice shown because ID was central, physical evidence lacking, and the expert testimony would likely have undermined confidence in the verdict |
| Admissibility and effect of prior out‑of‑court identifications admitted at trial | Ibar argued prior identifications were improperly used as substantive evidence and should have been challenged more effectively | State relied on the tape and other properly admitted identifications and witness testimony | Court previously found some admission error harmless on direct appeal, but here concluded the omission of an expert likely altered harmless‑error calculus; new trial warranted |
| Whether issues resolved on direct appeal or other postconviction claims require remand (e.g., Ring/Hurst claim, Brady) | Ibar raised additional claims (Brady, Ring/Hurst, preservation of evidence) | State urged resolution unnecessary if no Strickland relief | Court limited decision to the ineffective assistance claim and remanded for new trial; other claims left unaddressed as moot on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451 (Fla. 2006) (direct‑appeal opinion describing facts, evidence, and harmless‑error analysis)
- Penalver v. State, 926 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 2006) (reversal/remand for codefendant based on prejudicial admission of evidence and scant physical ties)
- Bradley v. State, 33 So.3d 664 (Fla. 2010) (standard of review for mixed questions in postconviction ineffective‑assistance claims)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (prejudice defined as undermining confidence in outcome)