Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627

Sawh owns Brody, a dog involved in three biting incidents in 2010 in Lino Lakes.
After the first bite, Brody was designated 'potentially dangerous' under City Code § 503.15(4).
After the second bite, Brody was designated 'dangerous' and Sawh was informed of a hearing before the City Council.
Two hearings were held: one on the dangerous designation and a second after a third bite, leading to destruction of Brody under § 503.16(4).
Sawh challenged the designations and destruction by writ of certiorari; the Court of Appeals reversed, citing procedural due process concerns.
The supreme court held that Sawh was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the initial 'potentially dangerous' designation and affirmed destruction on the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there a protected interest and due process required?	Sawh—due process required challenge to 'potentially dangerous' designation.	City—no protected interest at designation; only notice of designation given.	No due process for initial designation; two hearings after danger designation suffice.
Was the City's process constitutionally sufficient under Mathews?	Mathews requires meaningful opportunity to challenge designation before depriving property.	Hearings before the City Council provided notice and opportunity to be heard; adequate under Mathews.	Process deemed constitutionally sufficient; two hearings satisfied due process.
Was the designation of Brody as 'dangerous' supported by substantial evidence or arbitrary?	Evidence failed to prove Brody was dangerous; provocation argued by Sawh.	Prior 'potentially dangerous' designation plus October 15 bite supports dangerous ruling.	Designation not arbitrary or capricious; substantial evidence supports finding.
Was the destruction order arbitrary or capricious?	Destruction too harsh and relied on flawed designations.	Subsequent offense required destruction; no discretion after finding a 'subsequent offense'.	Destruction order not arbitrary or capricious; mandatory under § 503.16(4).

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (three-factor balancing test for due process)
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1972) (deprivation of property requires process only when property interest exists)
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1975) (informal hearing sufficient for student discipline)
Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490 (Minn. 1930) (dogs are personal property; deprivation implicates due process)
Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1990) (substantive due process considerations in school disputes)