Savage Services Corporation v. United States, 25 F.4th 925

Background

On Sept. 8, 2019, the M/V SAVAGE VOYAGER pushed tank barges through the Tennessee–Tombigbee Waterway; an Army Corps lockmaster allegedly dewatered a lock without warning, causing a barge to fall, rupture a cargo tank, and spill thousands of gallons of crude oil.
Savage (vessel owner) alleges the Army Corps was solely negligent and seeks roughly $4 million in oil-removal costs.
Savage sued the United States in admiralty, asserting common-law maritime claims and relying on the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) for waiver of sovereign immunity—rather than suing under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).
The district court dismissed Savage’s removal-cost claims, holding (1) the OPA does not authorize suits against the United States for removal costs and (2) the OPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme displaces the SAA waiver for OPA-covered removal claims.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed: it concluded the OPA (a detailed, specific remedial scheme) forecloses contribution/claims against the United States, does not reinstate a government-negligence defense, and preempts more general admiralty remedies under the SAA for OPA-covered oil-removal claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether OPA authorizes contribution suits against the United States	Savage: OPA permits contribution “against any other person” and the SAA allows admiralty suits against the U.S., so contribution against the U.S. is available	Government: OPA defines “person” and excludes the United States; Congress did not waive sovereign immunity in OPA	Held: OPA does not authorize contribution suits against the U.S.; the United States is not a “person” under §2701(27) for contribution purposes
Whether OPA preserves a complete defense where federal government negligence caused the spill	Savage: the “third party” exception in §2703(a) includes the U.S., restoring a governmental‑negligence defense	Government: OPA removed the explicit governmental‑negligence defense present in the predecessor statute and the statutory phrase “third party” cannot reasonably include the U.S.	Held: OPA eliminated a complete defense for governmental negligence; “third party” does not encompass the United States
Whether a plaintiff may bypass OPA and sue the U.S. under common‑law admiralty via the SAA	Savage: SAA’s broad waiver permits common‑law admiralty claims against the U.S. for removal costs	Government: OPA is a detailed, exclusive remedial scheme that displaces general admiralty remedies for OPA-covered claims	Held: OPA’s detailed remedial framework and its "notwithstanding" clause make it the exclusive source for OPA‑covered removal claims; plaintiffs cannot escape OPA by pleading common‑law admiralty under the SAA
Whether the OPA impliedly repealed or displaces the SAA for oil‑removal claims	Savage: any displacement must be express; implied repeal disfavored	Government: when a later, specific statute covers the same subject, it operates as the exclusive remedy even without explicit repeal language	Held: No problematic implied repeal doctrine obstacle—the OPA is the later, specific statute that displaces the SAA only for OPA‑covered oil‑removal claims

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012) (a detailed statutory remedial scheme preempts more general remedies and controls waiver questions)
Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (statutory structure can show Congress intended an exclusive remedy)
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (FWPCA is an all‑encompassing program displacing common‑law nuisance remedies)
In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995) (third‑party exception in predecessor statute does not include the United States)
United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2014) (OPA’s remedial scheme provides the exclusive remedy for statutory removal costs)
South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2000) (Congress intended the OPA to supplant existing admiralty law where OPA applies)
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (FWPCA does not necessarily preempt all common‑law remedies; distinguished here on statutory scope)
U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (omission of the United States from a statutory definition of “person” is significant)