Saunders v. Wilkie
886 F.3d 1356
Fed. Cir.2018Background
- Melba Saunders served on active duty (1987–1994); she was treated in service for knee pain and diagnosed with patellofemoral pain syndrome (PFPS). She reported ongoing bilateral knee pain after service.
- Saunders filed VA claims in 1994 and again in 2008; the VA Regional Office denied the knee claim for lack of current medical evidence and later because no diagnosed current pathology was identified.
- A 2011 VA examiner found subjective bilateral knee pain causing functional limitations (difficulty standing, needing a cane/brace sometimes, absenteeism) and opined the condition was at least as likely as not related to service, but stated no current pathology could be identified.
- The Board reopened Saunders’s claim as new and material but denied service connection, relying on Sanchez‑Benitez v. West for the proposition that “pain alone is not a disability” under 38 U.S.C. § 1110.
- The Veterans Court affirmed; a panel adopted that decision. Saunders appealed to the Federal Circuit challenging the legal interpretation of “disability” under § 1110 and the precedential effect of Sanchez‑Benitez.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to review Veterans Court legal ruling | Saunders: appeal raises a pure question of law about § 1110, so Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292 | Secretary: factual findings and application-of-law-to-facts issues were resolved below, limiting appellate review | Court: Federal Circuit has jurisdiction because the challenge is to the Veterans Court’s legal interpretation of “disability” |
| Whether pain alone can constitute a "disability" under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 | Saunders: "disability" means functional impairment (impairment of earning capacity); pain can cause functional impairment even absent diagnosable pathology | Secretary: pain must be tied to impaired ‘‘normal working movements’’ or supported by pathology; pain without diagnosis cannot qualify | Court: Reversed Veterans Court — pain, without an identified current pathology, can constitute a disability if it causes functional impairment affecting earning capacity |
| Remedy (what follows from legal error) | Saunders: Board’s and examiner’s findings require reversal and award | Secretary: Remand to Veterans Court/Board for further development | Court: Remanded to Veterans Court for remand to the Board to apply correct legal standard and make necessary factual findings regarding functional impairment, in‑service incurrence, and nexus |
Key Cases Cited
- Sanchez‑Benitez v. Principi, 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (prior appeal discussed; panel declined to decide whether pain alone is a disability)
- Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (articulates three elements required for service connection under § 1110)
- Thompson v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recognizes that functional loss may be due to pain and that pain may render a part seriously disabled)
- Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (statutory‑construction principle: begin with statutory language)
- Joyner v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the Veterans Court erred in concluding pain cannot evidence a qualifying chronic disability under § 1117)