Sauk Prairie Conservation Alli v. DOI, 944 F.3d 664

Background

The federal government transferred ~3,000+ acres of the former Badger Army Ammunition Plant to Wisconsin under the Federal Land to Parks Program; the deeds incorporated a four‑page Program of Utilization drafted by the Wisconsin DNR describing recreational uses at a high level and allowing later amendment by a Master Plan.
The DNR later adopted a Master Plan authorizing (1) limited dog training in a small area, (2) limited off‑road motorcycle riding (six days/year, restrictions), and (3) tentative continued Wisconsin National Guard helicopter training on Parcel V1 only if the V1 deed expressly permitted it.
Six earlier deeds conveyed parcels with the Program of Utilization restriction; the final deed for Parcel V1 included an explicit "notwithstanding" reservation permitting the Wisconsin National Guard to use Parcel V1 for rotary‑wing training if requested by the State or Governor.
The Sauk Prairie Conservation Alliance sued federal defendants under the Property and Administrative Services Act (40 U.S.C. § 550) claiming the three uses violated deed terms, and under NEPA (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.) claiming the National Park Service (NPS) failed to prepare EISs; district court granted summary judgment to defendants.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed: dog training and motorcycle riding were recreational and consistent with the Program; the helicopter use was authorized by a valid reservation in the V1 deed; and NEPA did not require an EIS (categorical exclusion for the two recreational uses; no NPS obligation to prepare an EIS for helicopter training because NPS lacked authority to prevent continued flights).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NPS approval of dog training and off‑road motorcycle riding violated the Property Act/deed restrictions	These activities were not in the original Program of Utilization and thus exceed conveyed purposes; NPS must enforce deed terms.	Program of Utilization set broad recreational purposes (list non‑exhaustive); Master Plan amendments implementing other recreational activities are consistent with the deed.	Held: No violation. The Program was non‑exhaustive; both activities are recreational and consistent with conveyed purposes.
Whether NPS approval of helicopter training violated the Property Act	Helicopter training is non‑recreational and thus inconsistent with the deed; reservation cannot override recreational requirement.	The Parcel V1 deed contains an explicit "notwithstanding" reservation permitting rotary‑wing training; §550(e)(4)(B) allows necessary reservations to safeguard government interests.	Held: No violation. The deed expressly reserved military use and §550 permits such reservations; the Alliance waived certain procedural challenges.
Whether NPS violated NEPA by not preparing an EIS for dog training and off‑road motorcycling	The NPS improperly relied on the State’s analysis; the minor‑amendment categorical exclusion is circular; extraordinary circumstances (controversy, uncertainty) require an EIS.	The changes fit the categorical exclusion for minor amendments; NPS permissibly relied on the DNR environmental analysis; no extraordinary circumstances shown (plaintiff waived some arguments).	Held: No violation. NPS’s reliance on the state EIS and its screening reasonably supported application of the categorical exclusion; decision not arbitrary or capricious.
Whether NPS violated NEPA by not preparing an EIS for helicopter training	Given substantial noise and unknown wildlife impacts, NPS should have prepared an EIS.	NPS had no discretion to stop the helicopter training because the Army conditioned the transfer on continued use; without agency causation, NEPA is not triggered.	Held: No EIS required. Under Public Citizen, NEPA does not apply where the agency lacks authority such that its action is not the but‑for/proximate cause of environmental effects.

Key Cases Cited

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (NEPA does not require analysis when agency lacks authority to prevent action causing environmental effects).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary‑and‑capricious standard: agency must consider relevant factors and explain decisions).
Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (NEPA review is deferential; narrow standard of review for agency action).
Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Illinois, 546 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2008) (associational standing elements for environmental organizations).
Highway J Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2003) (agency may rely on technical/state analyses and is owed deference on scientific matters).
Bernal v. NRA Grp., LLC, 930 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2019) (the word "including" introduces examples and is generally non‑exhaustive).
Rhodes v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussion of environmental assessments as a "rough‑cut" to determine if a full EIS is needed).