Saucedo, Andrew Melchor
576 S.W.3d 712
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2019Background
- Saucedo pleaded guilty (Jan 2014) to possession of >400g diluted codeine (1st‑deg felony) and 4–200g methamphetamine (2nd‑deg felony) and received deferred adjudication probation; no confirmatory lab tests had been completed at plea.
- A March 2014 HPD lab report (unknown to Saucedo at plea and revocation) identified the methamphetamine sample as methylethcathinone (a penalty‑group 2 substance); the analyzed amount was ~9.18 grams.
- A June 2017 HFSC report later identified the codeine sample as promethazine, a dangerous drug (misdemeanor), not a penalty‑group controlled substance.
- Saucedo’s probation was revoked (Jan 2017) and he received concurrent 10‑year prison terms; he then filed successive habeas applications arguing his pleas were involuntary and that due process barred convicting him of offenses his conduct did not actually constitute.
- The Court previously granted relief on the codeine/promethazine claim under Ex parte Mable; this concurrence considers whether Saucedo is entitled to relief for the methamphetamine/methylethcathinone charge and whether Mable should be overruled.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a guilty plea entered before lab confirmation is involuntary when post‑plea testing shows the substance differs (Mable claim) | Saucedo: Plea was involuntary because the substance was not methamphetamine but methylethcathinone | State: Plea was voluntary; defendant knew identity was unconfirmed and voluntarily pleaded; no fraud, coercion, or ineffective assistance | Concurrence: Plea was voluntary under Palmberg/Broussard and Supreme Court precedents; Mable should be overruled to the extent it holds otherwise |
| Whether due process requires vacating a conviction when new evidence shows the defendant was guilty only of a different (or lesser) offense (Wilson claim) | Saucedo: New lab report shows he was guilty only of possessing a penalty‑group 2 substance (methylethcathinone), making his conviction for methamphetamine improper | State: Theoretical eligibility for a second‑degree sentence exists for penalty‑group 2, and the State can reprosecute if appropriate | Held: Saucedo is entitled to relief under Wilson principles — no rational juror would convict him of possession of methamphetamine in light of the lab report; he may withdraw his plea but is not "actually innocent" |
| Whether Mable remains good law | Saucedo (and Mable): post‑plea factual developments can retroactively render plea involuntary | State and subsequent cases (Palmberg, Broussard): a defendant who knew a fact was unknown may still plead voluntarily; later factual errors don't invalidate plea absent misconduct | Concurrence: Mable is poorly reasoned and unworkable; it should be overruled to conform with Supreme Court decisions (Ruiz, Puckett) and contract/plea principles |
| Remedy and Sixth Amendment concerns if court recharacterizes guilt without trial | Saucedo: Court could treat new evidence as proving a different offense | State: Court could find theoretical eligibility; alternatively State may charge anew | Held: Cannot judicially declare Saucedo guilty of methylethcathinone without prosecution/jury determination; remedy is withdrawal of plea and return to district court; State may reprosecute if desired |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (held post‑plea lab results could render a plea involuntary where a crucial misapprehension existed)
- Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (plea remains voluntary when defendant knew identity of substance was unknown at plea)
- Ex parte Broussard, 517 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (defendant cannot withdraw plea merely because factual predictions proved incorrect)
- State v. Wilson, 324 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (claims that defendant is "guilty only of" a lesser offense or "ineligible for" imposed sentence can justify post‑conviction relief)
- United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2002) (plea knowingness does not require disclosure of all impeachment or detailed evidence; defendant need only understand nature of rights waived)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (U.S. 2009) (breach of plea bargain does not retroactively void the voluntariness of the plea; remedies for breach do not imply plea was never valid)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (U.S. 1970) (subsequent changes or errors in legal assessment do not by themselves render a plea involuntary)