Sarvis v. Judd, 80 F. Supp. 3d 692

Plaintiffs: Libertarian Party of Virginia, several Libertarian candidates, and one independent candidate challenged Virginia's tiered ballot-order statute (Va. Code § 24.2-613) after being placed in a lower ballot tier than "political party" candidates.
Virginia law places parties that received ≥10% in a statewide race in the first ballot tier; "recognized political parties" (like the Libertarian Party) are in the second tier; independents appear last alphabetically.
Plaintiffs alleged the tiered ordering (which reserves top positions for larger parties) denies them equal protection and First Amendment rights by depriving them of a "positional advantage" or "windfall vote."
Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Count II and the Court considered Count I (ballot order) on the Anderson/Burdick framework.
The Court assumed for motion-to-dismiss purposes that positional bias exists but held the burden on Plaintiffs was modest, not severe, and that Virginia's interests justified the statute.
Result: Court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Count I (statute constitutional) and denied moot as to Count II.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Virginia's tiered ballot-order statute violates First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying smaller-party/independent candidates a "positional advantage"	Tiered ordering reserves top ballot positions (and associated "windfall votes") for larger parties, burdening Plaintiffs' associational and expressive rights	The burden is modest: statute is facially neutral, facilitates a manageable, comprehensible ballot, preserves party-order symmetry, and reasonably favors parties with demonstrated support	Court: Burden is not severe; applying Anderson/Burdick balancing, the Commonwealth's important interests outweigh Plaintiffs' modest burden; statute is constitutional (Count I dismissed)
Whether the State must submit empirical proof at the 12(b)(6) stage to justify its asserted election interests	Plaintiffs argued the State must show factual/empirical nexus between classification and asserted interests to survive challenge	Commonwealth argued Anderson/Burdick does not demand elaborate empirical proof at motion-to-dismiss; articulation and plausible nexus suffice	Court: No requirement of elaborate empirical verification at this procedural juncture; State's articulated, reasonable interests suffice for the balancing test

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (framework for evaluating burdens on voting rights; balancing test)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (refinement of Anderson; burden-based standards ranging from strict scrutiny to deferential review)
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (States may adopt reasonable, neutral rules that may favor a two-party system)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6))
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (further articulation of pleading standard; reject conclusory allegations)
Wood v. Meadows (Wood II), 207 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 2000) (Anderson analysis; reasonable nondiscriminatory ballot-access regulations need not be justified by empirical proof)
Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Anderson/Burdick balancing to ballot-access regulations)