Sartain v. State
2017 MT 216
| Mont. | 2017Background
- In 2009 Danny Sartain was convicted of burglary in Gallatin County, Montana, sentenced to 40 years, and exhausted direct and postconviction appeals raising speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance claims.
- At trial the victim (Hop) later identified Sartain as the intruder; an officer observed Sartain running near the scene shortly after the reported burglary, and a neighbor (Schutz) also observed and identified him.
- Footprints at the scene and in an alley matched the tread and size of boots Sartain was wearing; a pry bar found in the alley matched pry marks on Hop’s doors.
- Crime-scene technician recovered partial fingerprint lifts from a medicine-cabinet mirror and a rear door; those lifts were insufficient at the time for traditional DNA analysis.
- Sartain sought postconviction touch-DNA testing of the fingerprint lifts, arguing newer touch-DNA methods could yield exculpatory results; the district court denied the petition as failing the statutory standard in § 46-21-110(5), MCA, and as not qualifying under the federal Innocence Protection Act (IPA).
- The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the IPA did not apply to Sartain and (2) even if touch-DNA testing excluded Sartain, the totality of trial evidence meant there was no reasonable probability the exclusion would have prevented his conviction under § 46-21-110(5)(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the federal Innocence Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 3600) required court-ordered touch-DNA testing | Sartain: IPA and federal precedent recognize touch DNA as new evidence; testing could exonerate him and is therefore timely | State: IPA applies only to federal prisoners or narrow state-offense circumstances not present; Montana statute provides adequate remedy | Held: IPA does not apply to Sartain; statutory remedy under Montana law is adequate |
| Whether § 46-21-110(5)(d), MCA, entitles Sartain to postconviction touch-DNA testing | Sartain: Favorable touch-DNA excluding him from the mirror/door would likely have exonerated him and changed the outcome | State: Even favorable results would not be material given eyewitness IDs, matching footprints, and pry-bar evidence; lack of DNA is not exculpatory | Held: Denied — Sartain failed to show a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted if testing had produced favorable results |
| Whether absence of Sartain’s DNA on items would be exculpatory | Sartain: Non-matching DNA would be new, material evidence undermining identity | State: Absence of DNA does not negate other strong inculpatory evidence; touch-DNA absence is equivocal | Held: Absence of DNA on mirror/door would not create reasonable probability of a different verdict |
| Whether the fingerprint lifts satisfy other § 46-21-110(5) requirements (availability, chain of custody, prior testing) | Sartain: Evidence remains available and could be tested with newer methods | State: Did not contest availability/chain-of-custody substantially; central dispute was materiality and prejudice | Held: Court assumed availability/chain satisfied but denied petition on materiality/prejudice grounds under subsection (5)(d) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Sartain, 357 Mont. 483, 241 P.3d 1032 (Mont. 2010) (direct-appeal facts and prior rulings summarized)
- State v. Sartain, 365 Mont. 483, 285 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2012) (postconviction IAC claims disposition)
- Golden v. State, 375 Mont. 222, 326 P.3d 430 (Mont. 2014) (standard of review for DNA-testing petitions)
- State v. Cooksey, 366 Mont. 346, 286 P.3d 1174 (Mont. 2012) (statutory interpretation standards)
- United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussion of touch DNA and its differences from traditional DNA testing)
- Bean v. State, 373 P.3d 372 (Wyo. 2016) (recognition that touch DNA can constitute new evidence)