Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc.
89 A.3d 841
Conn.2014Background
- Plaintiff Brian Sarrazin sought unpaid wages under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-60, 31-71b, 31-76c and regulation § 31-60-10(b), claiming commuting time was compensable.
- Sarrazin used a company vehicle required by Coastal, Inc., which also stored some tools used at job sites.
- Trial court found Coastal required use of the company vehicle but that its use conferred a benefit on Sarrazin and that tools stored in the vehicle were incidental to commuting; it denied recovery for commute time.
- Majority concluded federal wage law preempted state regulation § 31-60-10 and relied on federal standards to resolve the claim.
- Justice McDonald (joined by Justice Palmer) concurred: he agreed with rejecting deference to the department’s guidebook but would resolve the case under state law, interpreting § 31-60-10(b) to potentially cover some usual commutes when employer benefit and employee burden exceed de minimis levels.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 31-60-10(b) makes a usual commute compensable when employee performs services during commute | Sarrazin: § 31-60-10(b) can cover usual commute time when travel inures to employer and is incidental to employment | Coastal: commute time is noncompensable; subsections (c)/(d) show (b) does not apply to usual commute | Concurrence: § 31-60-10(b) can apply to usual commute in limited circumstances (employer obtains > de minimis benefit and employee incurs > de minimis burden); on facts, plaintiff not entitled because benefit to employee and tool storage were incidental |
| Whether federal law preempts state regulation as applied here | Sarrazin: state regulation provides broader protections and is not preempted | Coastal/majority: federal law governs; state rule cannot impose broader obligations inconsistent with FLSA | Majority: concluded federal law preempts state law for this claim; concurrence: disagreed — state regulation can provide equal or greater protection and is not preempted for these facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Shell Oil Co. v. Ricciuti, 147 Conn. 277 (discussing "in the course of employment" in related contexts)
- Morales v. PenTec, Inc., 57 Conn. App. 419 (addressing course-of-employment concepts)
- Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (ordinary noncompensability of commute; exceptions when activity is incidental to employment)
- Whitney v. Hazard Lead Works, 105 Conn. 512 (commute generally not in course of employment)
- McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547 (incidental-to-employment and employer-benefit exceptions)
- Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769 (wages linked to ascertainable efforts rendered for employer)
- West v. Egan, 142 Conn. 437 (policy behind wage standards tied to value of services)
- Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Servs., Inc., 274 Conn. 219 (travel may be in course of employment even if unpaid)
- State v. AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Council 4, Local 2663, 257 Conn. 80 (ambiguity in remedial statutes resolved for protected class)
- Tianti v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690 (remedial-scheme ambiguity resolved in favor of employees)
