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Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc.
89 A.3d 841
Conn.
2014
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Background

  • Plaintiff Brian Sarrazin sought unpaid wages under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-60, 31-71b, 31-76c and regulation § 31-60-10(b), claiming commuting time was compensable.
  • Sarrazin used a company vehicle required by Coastal, Inc., which also stored some tools used at job sites.
  • Trial court found Coastal required use of the company vehicle but that its use conferred a benefit on Sarrazin and that tools stored in the vehicle were incidental to commuting; it denied recovery for commute time.
  • Majority concluded federal wage law preempted state regulation § 31-60-10 and relied on federal standards to resolve the claim.
  • Justice McDonald (joined by Justice Palmer) concurred: he agreed with rejecting deference to the department’s guidebook but would resolve the case under state law, interpreting § 31-60-10(b) to potentially cover some usual commutes when employer benefit and employee burden exceed de minimis levels.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether § 31-60-10(b) makes a usual commute compensable when employee performs services during commute Sarrazin: § 31-60-10(b) can cover usual commute time when travel inures to employer and is incidental to employment Coastal: commute time is noncompensable; subsections (c)/(d) show (b) does not apply to usual commute Concurrence: § 31-60-10(b) can apply to usual commute in limited circumstances (employer obtains > de minimis benefit and employee incurs > de minimis burden); on facts, plaintiff not entitled because benefit to employee and tool storage were incidental
Whether federal law preempts state regulation as applied here Sarrazin: state regulation provides broader protections and is not preempted Coastal/majority: federal law governs; state rule cannot impose broader obligations inconsistent with FLSA Majority: concluded federal law preempts state law for this claim; concurrence: disagreed — state regulation can provide equal or greater protection and is not preempted for these facts

Key Cases Cited

  • Shell Oil Co. v. Ricciuti, 147 Conn. 277 (discussing "in the course of employment" in related contexts)
  • Morales v. PenTec, Inc., 57 Conn. App. 419 (addressing course-of-employment concepts)
  • Dombach v. Olkon Corp., 163 Conn. 216 (ordinary noncompensability of commute; exceptions when activity is incidental to employment)
  • Whitney v. Hazard Lead Works, 105 Conn. 512 (commute generally not in course of employment)
  • McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547 (incidental-to-employment and employer-benefit exceptions)
  • Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769 (wages linked to ascertainable efforts rendered for employer)
  • West v. Egan, 142 Conn. 437 (policy behind wage standards tied to value of services)
  • Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Servs., Inc., 274 Conn. 219 (travel may be in course of employment even if unpaid)
  • State v. AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Council 4, Local 2663, 257 Conn. 80 (ambiguity in remedial statutes resolved for protected class)
  • Tianti v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690 (remedial-scheme ambiguity resolved in favor of employees)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut
Date Published: Apr 29, 2014
Citation: 89 A.3d 841
Docket Number: SC18877 Concurrence
Court Abbreviation: Conn.