3 F.4th 844
6th Cir.2021Background
- Jack Huelsman, with diagnosed/paranoid and bipolar symptoms, exhibited delusions and expressed suicidal ideation; his wife Cheryl and daughter Sarah called 911 reporting psychiatric emergency and that there were guns in the house.
- Deputies Eric Gregory and Meredith Walsh responded; dispatch and family reported possible suicide risk and accessible firearms; EMS also responded but were told to stand down by Deputy Gregory.
- Deputy Gregory interviewed both spouses, spoke separately with Mr. Huelsman (who was coherent, denied intent) and Mrs. Huelsman (who repeatedly urged officers not to leave her husband alone and said he was suicidal); Gregory left Mr. Huelsman alone in the house for about nine minutes while he took calls in his patrol car.
- During that interval Mr. Huelsman fatally shot himself; plaintiffs (Mrs. Huelsman and Sarah Wilson) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (state-created-danger/due process), Title II of the ADA (failure to accommodate), and Ohio tort law (wrongful death and emotional distress).
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims (finding qualified immunity and state-law immunity); the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of § 1983 and ADA claims but vacated dismissal of state-law claims against Deputies Gregory and Walsh and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Deputies’ actions violated substantive due process via state-created-danger (suicide of non-custodial person) | Deputiffs’ affirmative acts (separating spouses, calling off EMS, leaving decedent alone) increased or created risk of suicide, invoking state-created-danger | State actors did not create risk because the suicide risk and access to weapons preexisted their arrival; prior precedent did not clearly extend state-created-danger to non-custodial suicide | Court: Declined to decide violation on merits because law was not "clearly established" for qualified immunity; affirmed summary judgment on § 1983 claims |
| Qualified immunity for Deputies on § 1983 claim | Plaintiffs: deputies had fair warning their conduct could be unconstitutional under state-created-danger doctrine | Deputies: no clearly established precedent extending state-created-danger to similar non-custodial suicide facts; reasonable officers could act as they did | Court: Deputies entitled to qualified immunity because controlling precedent did not clearly establish the claim |
| ADA Title II failure-to-accommodate claim (against Deputy Gregory) | Plaintiffs: calling off EMS denied reasonable accommodation (immediate mental-health evaluation/treatment) for Huelsman’s disability | Gregory: calling Mobile Crisis and providing deputy mental-health training were reasonable modifications; EMS offer was not clearly necessary or superior | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for Gregory—record showed Mobile Crisis/deputies provided reasonable accommodation; no denial of benefits established |
| Ohio statutory immunity (wanton/reckless conduct) for state-law torts | Plaintiffs: under Ohio law deputies acted recklessly by leaving Huelsman alone despite obvious risk (guns, suicidal statements, wife’s pleas) | Deputies: actions were at most negligent; they reasonably assessed a domestic dispute, relied on assurances guns were secured, summoned Mobile Crisis, and did not consciously disregard an obvious risk | Held: Vacated district court’s grant of state-law immunity—district court applied wrong standard (conflated deliberate indifference with Ohio recklessness); genuine disputes of material fact exist about recklessness and remand warranted for state-law claims |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (general rule that Due Process does not require state to protect individuals from private harm absent custody or special state-created danger)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (warning against defining "clearly established" law at high level of generality)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (qualified-immunity principle that officers must have fair notice their conduct violated clearly established law)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference formulation requiring actual knowledge of substantial risk)
- McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006) (teacher leaving classroom not an affirmative act creating risk where danger preexisted)
- Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (state-created-danger inquiry focuses on whether plaintiff was safer before state action than after)
- Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas, 412 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2005) (elements of state-created-danger doctrine)
- Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (school officials left suicidal student home alone—court found state-created-danger potentially applicable)
- Anderson v. City of Massillon, 983 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 2012) (Ohio definition of wanton/reckless conduct: risk may be "known or obvious" and recklessness can be found under an objective standard)