Sarah E. and Michael T. Magee v. Racing Corp. of West Virginia, 17-0008

On Dec. 2, 2012, the Magees were guests at Mardi Gras Casino; an encounter with casino security and Nitro police led to arrests and alleged misconduct.
Magees' counsel sent pre‑suit Notice of Claim on Nov. 21, 2014, received Nov. 24, 2014, addressed to Nitro Police Department and the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (WVRJCFA).
The two‑year statute of limitations for negligence claims expired Dec. 2, 2014; the Magees filed suit Dec. 23, 2014 (after lapse as to non‑State defendants but within 30‑day tolling for WVRJCFA).
Mardi Gras and Nitro defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as time‑barred; the circuit court dismissed claims against all defendants except WVRJCFA, concluding statutory tolling applied only to entities defined as "government agencies."
Magees appealed, arguing the § 55‑17‑3(a)(2) 30‑day tolling provision tolled the limitations period as to all named defendants when pre‑suit notice is given to any defendant requiring such notice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 30‑day tolling in W. Va. Code § 55‑17‑3(a)(2) tolled the statute of limitations as to all named defendants when pre‑suit notice was given to a government agency	Magees: the phrase "any applicable statute of limitations is tolled" means tolling applies to the limitations period for all named defendants once pre‑suit notice is given to a covered government agency	Mardi Gras/Nitro: the statute governs only "government agencies" as defined; tolling compensates only for additional pre‑suit notice required of those agencies and does not extend to private or non‑covered defendants	Court: tolling in § 55‑17‑3(a)(2) applies only to defendants qualifying as "government agencies" under the statute; claims against non‑covered defendants were time‑barred and dismissal was proper

State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995) (establishes de novo review for dismissal on motion to dismiss)
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (de novo review for statutory interpretation issues)
Caruso v. Pearce, 223 W. Va. 544, 678 S.E.2d 50 (2009) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for dismissals under Rule 41(b))
Motto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 220 W. Va. 412, 647 S.E.2d 848 (2007) (pre‑suit notice under § 55‑17 is jurisdictional)
Perdue v. Hess, 199 W. Va. 299, 484 S.E.2d 182 (1997) (statutes of limitations are statutes of repose and strictly construed)
Stevens v. Saunders, 159 W.Va. 179, 220 S.E.2d 887 (1975) (plaintiff bears responsibility to timely institute action)
Ganser‑Heibel v. Chavallo Complex, LLC, 293 P.3d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (analogous holding that similar pre‑suit tolling did not apply to private parties)