Santos v. Brown CA3
189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234
Cal. Ct. App.2015Background
- In October 2008 Esteban Nunez and companions attacked several unarmed men near San Diego State University; Luis Santos was fatally stabbed. Nunez pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 16 years.
- On January 2, 2011, Governor Schwarzenegger commuted Nunez’s sentence from 16 to 7 years without prior notice to the victims or the district attorney. Victims and the district attorney learned only after the public announcement.
- Plaintiffs (Luis Santos’s parents, the surviving victims, and the San Diego County DA) sued seeking to invalidate the commutation under the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 ("Marsy’s Law"), arguing it requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any early-release decision, including executive clemency.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings; the trial court held Marsy’s Law does not apply to the Governor’s exercise of constitutional clemency power and entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
- After the commutation, the Legislature enacted Penal Code § 4805 to require notice to DAs and reasonable efforts to notify victims for commutation applications, but that statute postdates the commutation at issue and was not applied retroactively here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marsy’s Law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a Governor’s commutation (executive clemency) | Marsy’s Law broadly protects victims’ rights at all "parole or other post-conviction release proceedings," so it should cover any early-release decision including clemency; victims requested notice. | Marsy’s Law expressly targets parole and other criminal-justice proceedings; it did not amend clemency statutes and clemency is an ad hoc executive act outside the criminal-justice proceedings Marsy’s Law governs. | Marsy’s Law does not apply to the Governor’s exercise of constitutional clemency (subd. (a)); judgment affirmed. |
| Whether the Governor’s clemency power can be implicitly limited by Marsy’s Law | Victims’ rights should be broadly construed to prevent any mechanism that shortens sentences without victim participation. | Voters amended parole statutes to add victims’ procedures but left clemency statutes untouched; absent explicit language, the electorate did not constrain clemency. | The court reads the statutory/constitutional text and voter materials to conclude Marsy’s Law did not alter clemency procedures. |
| Whether clemency is a "proceeding" in the "criminal justice system" under Marsy’s Law | "Proceeding" is broad and could include any act that results in early release, including commutation; lay voters would understand it that way. | "Proceeding" in context refers to public or quasi‑public adjudicatory processes (e.g., parole); clemency is discretionary ad hoc executive grace, not a proceeding. | Clemency is distinct from parole and not a "proceeding" within the scope of Marsy’s Law. |
| Whether post-commutation legislative enactment (§ 4805) shows Marsy’s Law already required notice | Plaintiffs argue legislative response confirms victims’ interest and supports a broad reading. | Defendants argue the Legislature’s enactment shows Marsy’s Law did not already apply to commutations. | The court finds the post hoc statute does not alter the voters’ original initiative; it does not control interpretation of Marsy’s Law here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Connerly v. Schwarzenegger, 146 Cal.App.4th 739 (Cal. Ct. App.) (standard for judgment on the pleadings)
- Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1998) (executive clemency is discretionary grace distinct from adjudicatory proceedings)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983) (distinguishing parole from commutation; commutation is ad hoc)
- In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616 (Cal. 2002) (clemency power historically nonjudicial and not a usual subject of judicial review)
- People v. Vicks, 56 Cal.4th 274 (Cal. 2013) (Marsy’s Law amendments to parole statutes and scope regarding parole hearings)
- California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, 53 Cal.4th 231 (Cal. 2011) (principles for construing initiatives and the presumption against implied repeal)
- In re Fain, 145 Cal.App.3d 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing parole and pardon/clemency powers)
- Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Governor’s clemency power is exclusive)