Santana v. Commonwealth
90 Mass. App. Ct. 372
| Mass. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Santana and a codefendant were tried on indictments charging aggravated rape (joint venture) and related counts; both admitted sexual activity but claimed consent.
- Jury was instructed on lesser included offenses; it convicted Santana of rape on one count (alleging the codefendant’s penile penetration) and acquitted him on other counts.
- On direct appeal this court (rule 1:28 memorandum) reversed Santana’s conviction, concluding the lesser-included instruction was improper and that "no rational view of the evidence" supported a verdict of rape but not aggravated rape on the charged theory.
- Santana filed an erroneous-conviction claim under G. L. c. 258D, § 1(B)(ii), asserting his reversal was "on grounds which tend to establish" his innocence.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth; the Appeals Court majority affirmed, holding the reversal did not rest on grounds tending to establish innocence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Santana is eligible under G. L. c. 258D § 1(B)(ii) (judicial relief on grounds tending to establish innocence) | Reversal of conviction based on improper jury instruction and the appellate panel's statements indicate grounds that tend to establish innocence | Reversal due to erroneous jury instruction does not, by itself, tend to establish innocence; appellate reversal reflected instructional error and ambiguity, not exculpatory facts | Court held Santana is not eligible: reversal for improper instruction did not rest on facts probative of his innocence |
| Whether the appellate panel’s language that "no rational view of the evidence" supports the verdict proves factual innocence | Panel’s conclusions and statements show the jury rejected evidence that Santana participated in the assault, tending to establish innocence | The panel’s reversal focused on legal inconsistency/ambiguous jury verdict; it did not establish exculpatory facts or preclude compromise verdict explanations | Court held the panel’s reversal did not resolve whether jury reached verdict by compromise vs. factual rejection; thus it did not satisfy § 1(B)(ii) |
| Whether eligibility inquiry requires testing merits of actual innocence | Santana: appellate language and factual findings show tendency to establish innocence without full merits trial | Commonwealth: eligibility is distinct from merits; it requires grounds probative of innocence but not a merits determination | Court reiterated eligibility is separate from proving innocence, but requires facts probative of noncommission of the offense |
| Whether incorrect jury instructions can, in some cases, satisfy § 1(B)(ii) | Santana: unique facts here allegedly make this case such an instance | Commonwealth: Guzman II and related precedent treat many instructional errors as not tending to establish innocence; context matters | Court applied precedent: instructional error here did not present omitted exculpatory evidence or other facts probative of innocence, so eligibility not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354 (2010) (explains § 1(B)(ii) eligibility requires grounds probative of innocence and distinguishes mere consistency with innocence)
- Guzman v. Commonwealth, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 466 (2009) (earlier discussion of eligibility and exculpatory-evidence standard)
- Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834 (2013) (eligibility requirement distinct from merits; explains "grounds resting on facts and circumstances probative" language)
- Renaud v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315 (2015) (eligibility inquiry separate from proving innocence at trial; consider unique facts)
- Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392 (1998) (incorrect jury instructions noted as examples that often do not satisfy § 1(B)(ii))
- Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 458 Mass. 367 (2010) (new trial granted where omission/recantation precluded factfinder from being fully informed; contrasted with instructional-error cases)
- Adams v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 360 (1993) (double jeopardy precludes retrial after acquittal)
- Commonwealth v. Roth, 437 Mass. 777 (2002) (verdict unreliability after partial-deadlock verdicts does not imply retrial permissible; distinguishes implications for innocence)
- Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563 (1912) (defines compromise verdict)
- Commonwealth v. Diaz, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 29 (1984) (jurors may deliver factually inconsistent verdicts; such verdicts are generally not disturbed)