924 F.3d 51
2d Cir.2019Background
- Petitioner Juan Carlos Santana‑Felix, a lawful permanent resident since 2006, was convicted in 2013 under NYPL § 105.15 for second‑degree conspiracy; IJ ordered removal and the BIA affirmed.
- BIA relied on two aggravated‑felony theories: (1) crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)), and (2) conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).
- After the Supreme Court decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, the § 16(b) crime‑of‑violence ground was invalidated as void for vagueness, leaving only the conspiracy‑to‑commit‑an‑aggravated‑felony theory.
- NYPL § 105.15 criminalizes agreement to commit a Class A felony with intent that the Class A felony be performed; the conviction record charged second‑degree murder as the conspiracy’s object.
- The Second Circuit applied an inchoate‑offense approach (analogous to the modified categorical approach): because conspiracy requires intent to commit a specific object crime, the court examined the record (indictment) to identify the object offense as second‑degree murder.
- The court concluded New York second‑degree murder (NYPL § 125.25) fits the federal generic definition of murder and thus the conspiracy conviction is an aggravated felony, denying the petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conviction under NYPL § 105.15 (conspiracy 2nd) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) | Santana‑Felix: § 105.15 is not categorically an aggravated felony because it covers conspiracy to any Class A felony, and not all Class A felonies are aggravated felonies | Gov: For inchoate offenses like conspiracy, court should identify the specific object crime from the record; here indictment shows object was second‑degree murder, which is an aggravated felony | Held: Using an inchoate/statutory approach, the indictment shows the object was 2nd‑degree murder, and NY 2nd‑degree murder categorically fits federal murder definition; conviction is an aggravated felony |
| Whether the categorical or modified categorical approach governs | Santana‑Felix: categorical approach shows mismatch | Gov: Inchoate offenses require proof of intent to a specific object; examine record to identify object | Held: For inchoate offenses, analogous to the modified categorical approach is appropriate; court may look to the record to identify the object offense |
| Whether the BIA could rely on the indictment (not signed by district attorney) | Santana‑Felix: indictment signature defect undermines reliance | Gov: indictment was a certified copy with typed DA signature and admissible | Held: Argument waived (not raised before BIA); even on merits, certified indictment with typed signature is admissible and fundamentally fair |
| Whether NY second‑degree murder matches federal murder for aggravated‑felony purposes | Santana‑Felix: various NY subsections may not all fit federal aggravated‑felony murder | Gov: NY 2nd‑degree murder (intent, depraved indifference, felony murder) corresponds to federal murder definitions | Held: NY 2nd‑degree murder requires malice/depraved indifference or felony murder and therefore categorically fits the federal definition of murder; it is an aggravated felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (categorical approach presumes conviction rests on least of acts criminalized)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (look only to statute; presumption regarding least conduct)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (divisible statutes and modified categorical approach principles)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (18 U.S.C. § 16(b) crime‑of‑violence definition void for vagueness)
- Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156 (inchoate offenses must be tied to specific object crime; examining record to identify object)
- Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (what constitutes the record of conviction for immigration purposes)
- Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (standard of review: de novo for whether a conviction is an aggravated felony)
- United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204 (definition of second‑degree murder as heightened disregard for human life)