Santa Fe Alliance v. City of Santa Fe
993 F.3d 802
| 10th Cir. | 2021Background
- Plaintiffs (Santa Fe Alliance for Public Health & Safety, Arthur Firstenberg, Monika Steinhoff) allege radio‑frequency (RF) emissions from cellular facilities on public rights‑of‑way cause serious health harms and have forced members to abandon homes/businesses and constrained travel and access to services.
- Plaintiffs challenged: (1) Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)); (2) New Mexico’s Wireless Consumer Advanced Infrastructure Investment Act (WCAIIA); (3) Amendments to Santa Fe City Code Chapter 27; and (4) three mayoral proclamations, asserting violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (takings, substantive and procedural due process) and the First Amendment (speech, petition, access to courts).
- District court dismissed all constitutional claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed but on partly different grounds: it found plaintiffs lacked standing for several claims and, for the claims where standing existed, plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
- Court held plaintiffs lack standing for: the takings claim, substantive due process claims (and several due process claims tied to the TCA and mayoral proclamations) because the alleged injuries were not fairly traceable to the challenged statutes/proclamations.
- The court found standing sufficient (at the pleading stage) for: (a) a procedural due process claim premised on WCAIIA/Amendments to Chapter 27 eliminating notice; and (b) the First Amendment claims (free speech and petition) — but dismissed those on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The Tenth Circuit remanded only to direct the district court to modify judgments dismissing for lack of standing to be without prejudice; a concurrence would have found standing to challenge the TCA but would dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for Takings claim (Count Three) | WCAIIA and Chapter 27 enabled siting of RF facilities that rendered homes/businesses uninhabitable, effecting a taking | Plaintiffs' injuries (past/future displacement) are not fairly traceable to the statutes; future takings speculative | No standing for takings; future takings unripe; dismissal (without prejudice for standing ground) |
| Standing for substantive due process (Counts One, Two, Eighteen re: TCA & proclamations) | Statutes and proclamations removed local regulation of RF harms and thus caused health/property injuries | Complaint fails to plausibly show localities would have regulated differently absent federal/state actions; injuries not fairly traceable | No standing for these substantive due process claims; dismissed without prejudice |
| Procedural due process re: elimination of notice/hearings (Count One limited aspect) | WCAIIA and Chapter 27 eliminated notice/opportunity to be heard for specific facility approvals | Defendants: legislative changes and state law preemption govern land‑use process; dismissal appropriate | Standing exists for procedural due process claim premised on loss of notice, but claim fails on the merits (12(b)(6)) because the acts are legislative and not subject to procedural due process challenge |
| First Amendment (speech and petition claims: Counts Four, Nineteen, Twenty) | Section 704, WCAIIA, and Chapter 27 bar local officials from considering health speech and thus chill/deny plaintiffs’ speech and petition rights | Defendants: laws do not punish or prohibit speech; First Amendment does not guarantee officials will adopt a speaker’s preferred position | Plaintiffs had standing to assert First Amendment claims, but failed to state claims: statutes do not restrict speech or access to courts; dismissal under 12(b)(6) affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete, particularized, imminent injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing and traceability requirements)
- T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 574 U.S. 293 (2015) (localities must state reasons supported by substantial evidence for denials under TCA)
- City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (TCA purpose: promote rapid deployment and balance local zoning authority)
- Bi‑Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (legislative action generally not subject to procedural due process individual hearings)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (framework for Takings Clause challenges)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleadings must permit reasonable inference of liability)
- Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Comm’rs of Elbert County, 838 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2016) (zoning ordinances are legislative acts)
- Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for Article III standing and Rule 12(b)(1))