Sanford v. Sanford, 124 So. 3d 647

Background

Samantha filed for divorce in Lamar County chancery court alleging fault grounds and alternatively irreconcilable differences; temporary custody and support orders issued pretrial.
On the day of trial the parties executed a written consent to withdraw fault grounds and a consent-to-divorce form, but they struck through designated issues and handwrote "All issues are settled and will be dictated into the record."
During the hearing the parties orally dictated a settlement into the record and each affirmed under oath they understood and would sign the written agreement later; the division of household goods remained unresolved and the chancellor indicated he might have to decide that issue.
After the hearing Samantha later attempted to withdraw consent; the chancellor found her in contempt for refusing to sign the written settlement and incorporated the transcribed oral agreement into the final divorce judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the parties had not satisfied either Miss. Code § 93-5-2(2) (a complete written agreement) or § 93-5-2(3) (a written consent specifying issues for the court to decide); the Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: neither statutory route was fully satisfied because (1) the written consent did not specifically set forth issues for the court to decide, and (2) the oral/recorded settlement did not resolve all property issues (household goods).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the chancellor properly granted divorce under § 93-5-2(2) based on the oral settlement dictated into the record	Sanford (plaintiff) argued the parties fully settled and the dictated agreement, acknowledged under oath, satisfied § 93-5-2(2) and could be incorporated	Leslie (defendant) argued the dictated settlement was binding and the chancellor properly enforced it and found contempt for refusal to sign	Held: No. § 93-5-2(2) requires a written agreement settling all custody, maintenance, and property rights; the household goods dispute remained unresolved, so requirements were not met
Whether the initial written consent satisfied § 93-5-2(3) to permit the court to decide designated issues	Sanford relied on the previously signed consent-to-divorce form as authorizing the court to decide remaining issues	Leslie argued the parties abandoned the § 93-5-2(3) consent by striking designated issues and representing everything was settled, and later confirmed a binding settlement	Held: No. The written consent did not specifically set forth issues for the court to decide (a statutory requirement), so § 93-5-2(3) was not satisfied
Whether the chancellor could hold Samantha in contempt for refusing to sign the settlement	Leslie argued Samantha affirmed the agreement under oath and later repudiated it, justifying contempt and enforcement	Samantha argued she withdrew consent before a proper statutory route was complete and that oral dictation did not create a legally sufficient settlement	Held: Implicitly no—because neither statutory mechanism was satisfied, the underlying judgment enforcing the dictated settlement could not stand; contempt order and enforcement were undermined by procedural failure
Whether the final judgment should be reversed and remanded	Sanford sought reversal of enforcement; Leslie sought enforcement of the judgment	Leslie urged affirmance of chancellor's incorporation of the transcribed agreement	Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the chancery court judgment, and remanded for proceedings consistent with statutory requirements

Key Cases Cited

Bougard v. Bougard, 991 So.2d 646 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (oral agreements dictated into the record can be binding under certain circumstances)
Cobb v. Cobb, 29 So.3d 145 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (same)
Shelnut v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 9 So.3d 359 (Miss. 2009) (legal questions reviewed de novo)