447 P.3d 1192
Or. Ct. App.2019Background
- Hampton hired Risseeuw as general contractor to harvest timber; Risseeuw subcontracted Sanford, Inc. (Sanford) to operate a feller-buncher on the Peregoy property.
- Sanford drove onto a wooden railcar bridge on Hampton land; the feller-buncher and Sanford fell into the stream when the bridge failed.
- Plaintiffs sued Hampton and Risseeuw for negligence, breach of contract, Employer Liability Law (ELL) liability (ORS 654.305–.336), and intentional interference with economic relations (IIER); trial court granted summary judgment to Hampton on IIER and ELL, and after trial a jury resolved remaining claims for defendants.
- On summary judgment the record showed Hampton designed and built the bridge and both Hampton and Risseeuw had rights to control roads/bridges; evidence showed Risseeuw personnel instructed Sanford to cross the bridge.
- Facts post-accident: Risseeuw stopped hiring plaintiffs; depositions and a recorded call showed contractors’ impressions that Hampton preferred they not hire plaintiffs, but no direct evidence of Hampton instructing contractors not to hire Sanford.
- Plaintiffs moved late to amend their complaint to add new negligence theories and majorly increase damages; the court allowed limited conforming amendments but denied adding new negligence theories or increasing noneconomic damages, citing prejudice and closed discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hampton’s summary judgment on IIER was erroneous | Hampton communicated (implicitly) it would cut off contractors who hired Sanford, using economic pressure — creates triable issue of intentional interference by improper means/purpose | No direct evidence Hampton instructed contractors not to hire Sanford; contractors’ beliefs were speculation; absence of improper means or intent | Affirmed: evidence insufficient to show Hampton intentionally interfered by improper means or for improper purpose; plaintiffs’ inferences were speculative |
| Whether Hampton was liable under ELL as an indirect employer | Hampton designed, built, and controlled the bridge (workplace instrumentality); the bridge (workplace environment) was the risk-producing activity, so Hampton retained right to control risk | The risk-producing activity was Sanford’s decision to drive the feller-buncher across the bridge; Risseeuw, not Hampton, exercised control over that activity | Affirmed: proper risk-producing activity was driving equipment across the bridge; no evidence Hampton retained legal right or actually exercised control over that activity |
| Whether denial of leave to file third amended complaint was erroneous | Plaintiffs needed to add new negligence specifications and greatly larger damages; amendment should be freely allowed under ORCP 23 A | Allowing late, substantively new claims and large damages would prejudice defendants and require reopening discovery; motion was untimely | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion—timing, prejudice, and need for reopening discovery supported denial of new theories and increased damages |
| Trial rulings excluding evidence and denying mid-trial ORCP 23 B conforming amendments | Plaintiffs argued exclusion and denial unfairly limited their case | Defendants relied on pleadings/scope; court found no error | Affirmed (court rejected these assignments without discussion) |
Key Cases Cited
- McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532 (summary of IIER elements and requirement of improper means or purpose)
- Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201 (improper means/purpose necessary for IIER liability)
- Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 328 Or. 487 (IIER wrongfulness must be beyond interference itself; examples of improper means)
- Woodbury v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 335 Or. 154 (ELL indirect-employer tests; define risk-producing activity to include task plus circumstances)
- Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co., 360 Or. 170 (ELL risk-producing-activity analysis—task at dangerous height)