SANDRA ROOPCHAND VS. COMPLETE CARE(L-3654-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-3223-15T4

Background

Sandra Roopchand, a medical technician, worked at Complete Care/FastCare from Jan 2013 until termination in July 2014; duties included patient care and clinic cleaning but not window-washing.
In July 2014 Roopchand informed owners Drs. Schaller and Fallon she was pregnant; she had a high-risk pregnancy due to hypothyroidism and required weekly OB visits.
After the practice was sold and RNs were fired, Roopchand assumed added responsibilities and was assigned to the renovated second floor. Her hours were reduced on a new August schedule.
On July 29, 2014 Dr. Fallon repeatedly asked her to wash second-floor windows (which she believed required a ladder); she refused three times, citing it was not her duty and her pregnancy risk.
Dr. Fallon fired Roopchand for insubordination on the spot; she later prevailed on unemployment appeal. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, finding insubordination a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and that plaintiff had not requested a pregnancy accommodation.
The Appellate Division reversed, finding Roopchand presented a prima facie PWFA/pregnancy-discrimination claim and created a genuine issue whether the termination was pretextual or penalized an accommodation request.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff established a prima facie pregnancy-discrimination claim under the LAD/PWFA	Roopchand: she was pregnant, known to employer, performing job, then demoted/asked to perform non‑routine hazardous task and fired — supports inference of discrimination	Defendants: termination was for insubordination; no pregnancy discrimination	Held: Yes — viewing facts favorably to plaintiff, she made out a prima facie case under the PWFA
Whether employer articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason	Defendants: termination for insubordination is legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason	Plaintiff: refusal to climb/clean windows while high‑risk pregnant is not insubordination; reason may be pretext	Held: Employer did articulate insubordination, but factual disputes as to pretext prevent summary judgment
Whether plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation and whether request was required to proceed	Roopchand: she requested weekly doctor visits and informed employer of high‑risk pregnancy — can be a pregnancy accommodation	Defendants: she never requested an accommodation or physician‑directed restriction as PWFA requires	Held: Court found triable issues on whether plaintiff sought an accommodation and whether she was penalized for it
Whether termination was pretextual	Roopchand: contemporaneous comments (“she’s a liability”), only she was asked to wash windows, non‑pregnant insubordinate employee was not fired	Defendants: denial and claim of legitimate discipline; dispute over ladder necessity	Held: Circumstantial evidence sufficed to create a genuine issue of fact as to pretext; summary judgment reversed

Key Cases Cited

Tarabokia v. Structure Tone, 429 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369 (2010) (summary judgment: view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (2005) (adoption of McDonnell Douglas framework for LAD cases)
Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 1996) (prima facie evidentiary burden described as modest)
Tisby v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 448 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 2017) (shifting burdens and proof of pretext under LAD)
El‑Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145 (App. Div. 2005) (evidence to discredit employer’s nondiscriminatory reason)
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010) (variation in prima facie elements depending on claim nature)
Rendine v. Pantzer, 276 N.J. Super. 398 (App. Div. 1994) (framework for LAD termination cases); Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995) (affirming earlier decision)
Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Sch., 323 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 1999) (circumstances giving rise to inference of unlawful discrimination)
Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005) (discussion of prima facie elements and inference of discrimination)