Sandra L. Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church
509 S.W.3d 886
| Tenn. | 2016Background
- Brainerd Baptist Church ("Church") bought four AEDs from ExtendLife in 2008 and purchased an "Annual Physician Oversight Program" and four complimentary training classes; some training occurred but Church later used an independent trainer.
- In 2011, Church patron Jerry Wallis collapsed at the Church gym; an onsite AED was retrieved but not deployed; Wallis later died. His widow, Sandra Wallis, sued the Church for wrongful death and negligence.
- The Church filed a third-party claim against ExtendLife, alleging ExtendLife contractually agreed to provide physician oversight and ensure AED compliance/training, and seeking indemnity if Church were held liable.
- Wallis later amended to name ExtendLife, alleging (1) direct negligence in maintaining/providing AEDs and training, and (2) that Wallis was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between Church and ExtendLife.
- ExtendLife moved for summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to Wallis (independently or via contract), Church had no common-law or statutory duty to acquire or use AEDs, and Wallis was not a third-party beneficiary; trial court denied; Tennessee Supreme Court granted interlocutory review.
- The Supreme Court reversed: held ExtendLife owed no duty to Wallis independent of contract; Church owed no statutory or common-law duty to acquire or use AEDs; Wallis was not an intended third-party beneficiary; summary judgment for ExtendLife.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AED seller (ExtendLife) owed a duty to injured third party absent contractual duty | Wallis argued ExtendLife undertook duties (maintenance, accessibility, training) that created tort liability to users | ExtendLife argued no duty to third parties independent of contract; any obligations were contractual only | Held: No tort duty to third parties independent of the contract; ExtendLife not liable in negligence absent contractual duty |
| Whether the sale/oversight contract imposed obligation to provide training to owner employees | Wallis/Church: contract (and oversight program) obligated ExtendLife to provide training/oversight | ExtendLife: contract did not create binding obligations to third parties; scope disputed and not intended to create duty to patrons | Held: Contract did not evidence intent to create an enforceable benefit to patrons; no contractual duty to Wallis to compel ExtendLife conduct |
| Whether Wallis was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract | Wallis: contract terms and program purpose show intent to benefit users like her husband | ExtendLife: contract benefits were for Church; any patron benefit incidental, not intended | Held: Wallis was not an intended third-party beneficiary—part (3) of Owner-Operator test not satisfied; benefits incidental |
| Whether Church had common-law or statutory duty to acquire, make available, or use AEDs | Wallis: Church owed a duty to maintain AED program and use AED on patrons | ExtendLife/Church: Tennessee AED statutes encourage but do not mandate acquisition or use; common-law duty to render aid doesn’t include requiring AED acquisition/use | Held: Church had no statutory or common-law duty to acquire/make available/use AEDs; consequently contract could not have been intended to discharge such a duty |
Key Cases Cited
- Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare–Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. 2010) (summary judgment standards)
- Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 2015) (moving party burdens and Rule 56 practice)
- Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Concord EFS, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 63 (Tenn. 2001) (test for intended third-party beneficiary)
- West v. Shelby Cnty. Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014) (contract interpretation principles)
- Cullum v. McCool, 432 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2013) (business-patron special-relationship duty context)
- Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1985) (duty to render aid by host/business)
- Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462 (Tenn. 2005) (approval of Restatement section on negligent performance of undertaking)
- Verdugo v. Target Corp., 327 P.3d 774 (Cal. 2014) (survey of authorities holding business duty does not require acquisition/use of AEDs)