Sandra Kay Embesi v. Charles Ray Hall
09-17-00254-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 13, 2017Background
- Sandra Embesi and Charles Hall divorced (2008); Embesi later obtained a bill of review and the parties entered into a 2013 agreed Final Decree of Divorce after settlement negotiations.
- The 2013 Decree specifically awarded portions of Charles’s ExxonMobil Savings Plan to both parties (via a QDRO awarding Embesi $150,000) and awarded certain retirement accounts to Charles, but made no mention of an ExxonMobil pension plan.
- Charles retired from ExxonMobil in 2017; he testified his ExxonMobil pension was worth about $900,000 at retirement.
- Embesi discovered the undistributed pension and filed a Petition for Post‑Divorce Division of Property under Tex. Fam. Code § 9.201 asserting the pension was not divided by the 2013 Decree.
- The trial court denied Embesi’s petition; this brief (appellant’s brief) argues the trial court abused its discretion because the decree is unambiguous and silent as to the pension, leaving it undivided and subject to post‑divorce division.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Embesi) | Defendant's Argument (Hall) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ExxonMobil pension was divided by the 2013 Final Decree | The decree is unambiguous and silent as to the pension; silence means the pension was not awarded and remains subject to post‑divorce division | The decree’s broad retirement language or other awards implicitly disposed of pension (implied argument) | Trial court denied post‑divorce division; appellant contends denial was an abuse of discretion |
| Whether post‑divorce partition is available for an overlooked asset | Tex. Fam. Code §9.201 and Texas cases allow dividing property omitted from decree; the decree omitted pension | Opposing position would argue the decree disposed of all relevant retirement benefits | Appellant asserts statute and precedent permit reopening to divide the omitted pension |
| Standard for interpreting an agreed divorce decree | Agreed decree is construed as a contract; unambiguous terms control and intent is found in the four corners | Opposing view would attempt broader construction to include pension under awarded categories | Appellant argues the decree’s language is not broad enough to encompass a pension; expert testimony supports that pension is distinct |
Key Cases Cited
- In Re Marriage of McDonald, 118 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2003) (abuse of discretion standard for post‑divorce property division)
- Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1980) (clear abuse of discretion shown when division is manifestly unjust)
- Bishop v. Bishop, 74 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2002) (post‑divorce partition appropriate for undivided assets)
- Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (post‑divorce division where decree did not dispose of property)
- Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986) (agreed divorce decree interpreted under contract law)
- Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1973) (decree binding only as to property actually awarded; omitted property may justify reopening)
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (contract ambiguity principles)
- Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. 2009) (unambiguous decree construed literally as a matter of law)