Sandlands C & D LLC v. County of Horry
737 F.3d 45
4th Cir.2013Background
- Horry County created the Horry County Solid Waste Authority (SWA), a public entity that owns/operates county landfills and sets tipping fees; the SWA is controlled and funded in part by the County.
- In 2009 the County enacted a Flow Control Ordinance requiring all “acceptable waste” generated in Horry County to be disposed only at SWA-operated or SWA-designated public facilities. Private landfills outside the county were effectively barred from receiving Horry County waste.
- The Ordinance includes licensing and enforcement provisions and excludes recyclables and certain hazardous wastes; it has resulted in SWA facilities receiving over 99% of the county’s waste in reported years.
- Private actors Sandlands (a nearby private C&D landfill in Marion County) and EDS (a hauler) lost business and challenged the Ordinance in federal court after removal, asserting Dormant Commerce Clause and Equal Protection claims (among others).
- The district court granted summary judgment to Horry County; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the Ordinance neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor violates equal protection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Flow Control Ordinance violate the Dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory? | Ordinance discriminates by favoring in-county entities and excluding Sandlands/others; differential treatment exists. | Ordinance favors a public facility and treats all private businesses the same; United Haulers permits government-favoring flow control. | Held: Not discriminatory; treats private actors alike and benefits public entity. |
| If non-discriminatory, does the Ordinance fail the Pike balancing test? | Burden on (local and potentially interstate) commerce outweighs benefits; revenue motive improper. | Ordinance advances legitimate local interests (waste management, health, recycling, integrated financing); benefits outweigh any incidental burdens. | Held: Satisfies Pike—benefits are substantial and comparable to those upheld in United Haulers. |
| Are there genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment about discriminatory application (e.g., selective allowance of out-of-county disposal)? | Evidence that some waste left county and that SWA allowed some transfers shows unequal enforcement. | The small amount of waste leaving was either outside ordinance scope (unacceptable waste) or unauthorized; plaintiffs present no contrary evidence. | Held: No genuine dispute of material fact; plaintiffs’ evidence insufficient. |
| Does the Ordinance violate the Equal Protection Clause by treating similarly situated private businesses differently? | Sandlands and EDS were intentionally treated differently (loss of market; citations). | No purposeful differential treatment of similarly situated private actors; all private landfills/haulers are equally restricted. | Held: No equal protection violation; plaintiffs failed to show intentional disparate treatment. |
Key Cases Cited
- United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (upholding government-favoring flow control ordinances and treating them as non-discriminatory)
- Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (facially or practically discriminatory state measures are virtually per se invalid under Dormant Commerce Clause)
- C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating ordinance that favored a private facility)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (balancing test for nondiscriminatory regulations affecting interstate commerce)
- Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (analysis begins by asking whether law discriminates against interstate commerce)
- Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (application of Dormant Commerce Clause to local protectionist measures)
- Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001) (elements for an equal protection claim: disparate treatment of similarly situated parties and intentional discrimination)
- Building Graphics, Inc. v. Lennar Corp., 708 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2013) (de novo review of district court’s grant of summary judgment)