Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. D. D. McCullough
212 So. 3d 69
Miss.2017Background
- On May 24, 2010, grower D.D. McCullough and Sanderson Farms employee George Varnado had a confrontation at McCullough’s chicken farm after Varnado prepared a deficiency report under a Boiler Production Agreement.
- McCullough stood in front of Varnado’s truck and repeatedly demanded Varnado exit the vehicle; McCullough alleges Varnado accelerated and struck him three times, ultimately causing him to fall and sustain injuries.
- Varnado denies the incident occurred (and denies any intent to hit McCullough); parties exchanged deposition testimony and limited discovery. McCullough’s suit was pleaded as negligence; defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the facts show an intentional tort.
- McCullough filed the complaint on June 17, 2011—about one month after the one-year limitations period for intentional torts expired.
- The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to intent; the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted interlocutory review.
- The Supreme Court analyzed whether the substance of McCullough’s claim sounded in intentional tort (assault/battery) rather than negligence and whether the one-year statute of limitations barred the action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the claim sounds in negligence or intentional tort (affecting statute of limitations) | McCullough: alleges negligent operation of a vehicle; three-year statute applies | Defendants: facts show deliberate conduct constituting assault/battery; one-year statute applies | Court: Claim substantively alleges intentional tort (assault/battery); one-year statute applies; action time-barred |
| Whether case should survive summary judgment given disputed testimony about whether the incident occurred | McCullough: deposition supports negligence theory and disputed facts preclude summary judgment | Defendants: plaintiff’s own testimony indicates intent; Varnado’s denial of the incident does not create a triable negligence issue | Court: Plaintiff’s deposition testimony admits intentional conduct; no genuine issue of material fact on negligence element; summary judgment proper |
| Whether Sanderson liable for intentional acts of employee | McCullough: seeks to hold Sanderson liable for Varnado’s conduct | Sanderson: employer liability not reached if act was intentional and time-barred | Court: Because claim is barred as intentional tort, employer liability issue is immaterial and not addressed further |
| Whether plaintiff waived contractual dispute-resolution or asserted negligent supervision properly | McCullough: argued negligent supervision in response; also had separate breach-of-contract suit | Defendants: arbitration/contract procedures and pleading deficiencies | Court: Negligent supervision not properly pled or developed; issue not considered on merits (immaterial after primary holding) |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and genuine-issue requirement)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (movant entitled to judgment when nonmovant fails to prove an essential element)
- Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 678 (Mississippi application of Celotex/Celotex principle)
- Webb v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 946 (distinction between negligent conduct and intentional assault/battery)
- Nichols v. Tri State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324 (when intentional conduct fits enumerated torts, one-year statute applies)
- City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So. 2d 1212 (cannot evade statute of limitations by mislabeling an intentional tort)
- Peaster v. David New Drilling Co., 642 So. 2d 344 (intentional behavior element contrasted with negligence)