Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174

Sanchez suffered irreversible brain damage from a work fall, resulting in complete homonymous hemianopsia and 50% visual field in each eye.
She sought a hardship transfer to Albuquerque for medical treatment and family support; the Forest Service declined the request.
Her impairment affected reading, required special lighting, caused eye strain, and limited computer use; she also had transportation challenges.
Sanchez was temporarily detailed to Albuquerque for 120 days, encountered performance concerns there, and was not selected for equivalent positions; she later took a pay cut to transfer to Albuquerque.
She filed a Rehabilitation Act suit alleging failure to accommodate and hostile environment; the district court granted summary judgment finding no disability.
On appeal, the circuit held that a transfer for medical treatment could be a reasonable accommodation and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sanchez is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.	Sanchez's substantial seeing impairment is a disability.	Forest Service contends impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity.	Yes; material fact issues exist on substantial limitation of seeing.
Whether transfer accommodations for medical treatment fall within Rehabilitation Act obligations.	Transfers for treatment may be required to accommodate disabilities.	Transfers for treatment are not contemplated by the Act or are per se unreasonable.	Not per se unreasonable; may be a reasonable accommodation in appropriate cases.
Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the disability issue and potential accommodations.	Disability and reasonable accommodation issues preclude summary judgment.	No genuine dispute as to disability warrants summary judgment.	Remanded; district court erred in granting summary judgment.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1999) (mitigating measures may be considered when evaluating substantial limitation)
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1999) (definitional framework for disability; impairment considerations in major life activity)
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003) (legal standard for disability and major life activities in the Tenth Circuit)
Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (substantial limitation analysis and comparison to general population)
Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (reasonable accommodation includes medical-treatment related leaves)
Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 1999) (leaves as reasonable accommodations under disability law)
Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1993) (transfer for treatment may be a reasonable accommodation)
Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996) (accommodations can enable equal enjoyment of employment privileges)