26 I. & N. Dec. 71
BIA2012Background
- Sanchez-Lopez is a Peruvian native and lawful permanent resident since 1993.
- On April 19, 2011, he was convicted in California of stalking under 646.9(b), sentenced to 2 years.
- The Immigration Judge found him removable under 237(a)(2)(E)(i) and denied cancellation under 240A(a).
- The respondent appealed the removal and cancellation determinations; the Board dismissed the appeal.
- The Board defined “crime of stalking” under 237(a)(2)(E)(i) using ordinary meaning informed by legal usage due to lack of statutory definition.
- Under the California statute, stalking requires willful, repetitive conduct causing the target to fear for safety; the Board held this qualifies as a “crime of stalking.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of crime of stalking under 237(a)(2)(E)(i). | DHS argues California 646.9 satisfies the statute. | Sanchez-Lopez contests interpretation but primarily challenges consequences rather than the basic definition. | 646.9 qualifies as a crime of stalking. |
| Waiver eligibility under 237(a)(7)(A) bearing on proceedings. | Sanchez-Lopez claimed the IJ should consider extreme cruelty waiver. | No prima facie showing of extreme cruelty; discretionary analysis stands. | No error in not considering a waiver based on extreme cruelty. |
| Denial of cancellation of removal as a discretionary matter. | Discretionary factors may weigh in favor of relief. | Respondent's recidivism and other factors justify denial. | Cancellation of removal properly denied as a matter of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2008) (definition of ‘crime of stalking’ framework; used to inform ordinary-meaning approach)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1979) (statutory interpretation uses ordinary, contemporary meaning)
- Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2008) (supports ordinary-meaning definition of stalking for 237(a)(2)(E)(i))