San Jacinto River Authority v. Vicente Medina, Ashley Medina and Aris Antoniou
570 S.W.3d 820
Tex. App.2018Background
- San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) operates Lake Conroe and released water during Hurricane Harvey; downstream Kingwood homes flooded.
- Homeowners sued SJRA in Harris County district courts asserting: inverse condemnation (including inundation easement theory) and statutory takings under Gov’t Code ch. 2007.
- SJRA filed Texas Rule 91a motions to dismiss asserting governmental immunity; trial courts denied the motions and SJRA sought interlocutory appellate review.
- SJRA also argued for the first time on appeal that Harris County civil courts at law have exclusive jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation claims under Gov’t Code §25.1032(c).
- The appeals present two core questions: (1) whether district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation claims in Harris County, and (2) whether homeowners pleaded sufficient facts under Chapter 2007 to waive governmental immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation claims | Homeowners: no statutory condemnation/bona fide offer here, so district court may hear inverse-condemnation and Chapter 2007 claims | SJRA: §25.1032(c) gives Harris County county civil courts at law exclusive jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation claims | Court: §25.1032(c) still vests exclusive jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation in Harris County county courts at law; inverse-condemnation claims dismissed without prejudice to refiling there |
| Venue for Chapter 2007 statutory takings claims | Homeowners: Chapter 2007 actions must be filed in district court where property is located | SJRA: Chapter 2007 doesn’t apply to flooding physical takings; homeowners fail to plead waiver of immunity | Court: District courts have jurisdiction over Chapter 2007 claims; Chapter 2007 applies to physical invasions and waives immunity to extent of liability created |
| Sufficiency of pleaded intent for constitutional taking | Homeowners: alleged SJRA intentionally/knowingly released water and knew prior releases flooded specific downstream properties; pleaded addresses and historical incidents | SJRA: pleadings are conclusory; plaintiffs needed to allege SJRA knew flooding of each specific parcel was substantially certain | Court: Pleadings, liberally construed, alleged sufficient facts that SJRA intended or was substantially certain releases would flood the identified properties; survives Rule 91a |
| Causation/public-use elements of takings claim | Homeowners: alleged releases caused or exacerbated flooding, more severe/rapid flooding, property damage and diminished value; releases were to protect dam/infrastructure/public safety (public use) | SJRA: flooding arose from a confluence of sources (rain, inflows), releases went into river and commingled, and reservoir not designed for flood control; no public-use taking | Court: Plaintiffs pleaded proximate causation and public-use purpose (protecting dam/infrastructure/public benefit); factual disputes and extrinsic evidence not considered on Rule 91a, claims survive |
Key Cases Cited
- Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2004) (upholds takings liability where reservoir releases foreseeably changed downstream flooding regime)
- Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016) (defines intent standard for takings: intentional act or substantial certainty of damage)
- City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004) (no takings where city lacked knowledge that its act would cause specific flooding damage)
- City of Houston v. Guthrie, 332 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (Chapter 2007 claims must be filed in district court; district court lacks jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation where county courts at law have exclusivity)
- Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (federal takings precedent addressing downstream flooding and noting unresolved question whether foreseeable downstream impacts aimed at particular owners constitute occupation)