San Francisco A.I.D.S. Foundation v. Trump, 4:25-cv-01824

Background

In January 2025 the President issued three Executive Orders restricting "DEI" programs and targeting so-called "gender ideology." Plaintiffs are nine nonprofit organizations that provide health, social services, advocacy, and cultural programs for LGBTQ (many specifically transgender) communities and rely substantially on federal grants and contracts.
Plaintiffs sued and moved for a preliminary injunction challenging nine provisions of the Orders (termination, certification, lists, reporting, and other directives). Several agencies issued termination notices or directives to implement the Orders against some plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs asserted claims under the First Amendment (unconstitutional conditions/viewpoint discrimination), the Fifth Amendment (equal protection and vagueness/due process), and separation-of-powers/Spending Clause doctrines (ultra vires terminations overriding statutory grant schemes).
The court held plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge four provisions in particular (Certification Provision; Equity Termination Provision; Gender Termination Provision; Gender Promotion Provision) because threatened or actual grant terminations are concrete pocketbook injuries and plaintiffs can assert third‑party standing for clients.
On the merits the court found plaintiffs likely to succeed as to the Equity Termination Provision and the Gender Termination and Gender Promotion Provisions (First Amendment, equal protection, and as‑applied separation‑of‑powers/statutory conflict), but not as to the Certification Provision’s facial First Amendment/vagueness challenge.
The court preliminarily enjoined the agency defendants from enforcing the Equity Termination Provision, Gender Termination Provision, and Gender Promotion Provision against these plaintiffs, set a nominal bond of $1,000, and denied defendants’ request for a stay.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge funding, certification, and reporting provisions	Plaintiffs suffer imminent pocketbook and operational harms from actual/threatened grant terminations; third‑party standing to vindicate clients' equal protection	Orders are policy directives; intragovernmental lists/reports cause speculative reputational injury; Tucker Act divests district court	Court: plaintiffs have standing to challenge Certification, Equity Termination, Gender Termination, and Gender Promotion provisions; no standing for List, Enforcement‑Threat, Intimate‑Spaces, DEIA/Diversity Termination provisions. Tucker Act does not preclude district court jurisdiction for constitutional/injunctive relief.
First Amendment challenge to Funding Provisions (Equity Termination; Gender Termination; Gender Promotion)	Funding conditions broadly censor and suppress protected speech/services (viewpoint and status‑based discrimination); leverage subsidies to regulate outside program scope; censorious purpose	Government may set funding priorities and limit funding; restrictions apply only to funded activity and enforce anti‑discrimination law	Court: plaintiffs likely to succeed—provisions are untethered to programmatic objectives, operate like Velazquez (unconstitutional condition), and evidence a censorious purpose; Gender provisions also exclude transgender‑serving programs (status discrimination).
Vagueness / Due Process (Equity vs Gender vs Certification)	Equity Termination and other provisions are so vague that grantees cannot know what conduct will trigger termination; Certification is vague because "illegal DEI" is undefined	Gender Order defines "gender ideology"; Certification is limited to DEI that "violate any applicable Federal anti‑discrimination laws," so not impermissibly vague	Court: Equity Termination is likely unconstitutionally vague (facial and as‑applied). Gender Termination/Promotion are not unconstitutionally vague (order defines "gender ideology"). Certification Provision not likely to succeed on vagueness/First Amendment claim because its limiting text ties it to violations of existing federal antidiscrimination law.
Separation of Powers / Spending Clause (terminating congressionally‑authorized grants)	Orders unlawfully commandeer appropriated funds and conflict with statutory grant schemes (e.g., Ryan White, HOPWA, FQHC statutes; ACA/PHSA anti‑discrimination provisions)	Provisions contain "as permitted by law" / "to the maximum extent allowed by law" savings clauses; Executive has discretion to terminate some grants/contracts	Court: facial challenge failed (some grants/contracts may be terminable lawfully), but as‑applied plaintiffs likely to succeed because the Equity Termination Provision conflicts with statutory mandates (Ryan White, HOPWA, FQHC) and the Gender provisions conflict with federal antidiscrimination statutes (ACA §1557 and PHSA).

Key Cases Cited

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (limits on funding conditions that reach outside program scope)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding funding restrictions tied to program scope)
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (funding condition that suppressed program‑relevant speech unconstitutional)
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (vagueness and viewpoint concerns in selective‑subsidy context)
City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) (executive action conditioning grants found to conflict with Spending Clause)
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limits on executive authority)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (Article III standing requirements)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing and burden of proof at successive stages)
Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019) (government may not administer subsidy programs with a censorious purpose)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (vagueness and "close cases" do not alone render a statute void for vagueness)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury)