San Diego Housing Commission v. Public Employment Relations Board
200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- San Diego Housing Commission (Commission) and SEIU Local 221 (Union) reached an impasse over the effects of layoffs for two Union-represented employees; Union requested PERB-ordered factfinding under Gov. Code §3505.4(a).
- PERB granted the Union’s request over the Commission’s objection; Commission filed for declaratory relief and writ of mandate to prohibit PERB-ordered factfinding in this dispute.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, holding the Act’s factfinding provisions apply only to impasses arising during negotiation of a new or successor memorandum of understanding (MOU), not to discrete bargainable issues.
- PERB appealed; Court of Appeal considered whether the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act’s (MMBA) factfinding procedures apply to impasses over any bargainable matter or only to MOU negotiations.
- Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding the factfinding provisions apply to impasses over any negotiable term or condition of employment, and remanded; Commission’s cross-appeal on fees/costs dismissed as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commission) | Defendant's Argument (PERB) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MMBA factfinding provisions apply only to impasses during negotiation of a comprehensive MOU or to impasses over any bargainable matter | §3505.4–.7 are intended for MOU bargaining; criteria in §3505.4(d) (comparables, CPI, overall compensation) make sense only for MOU negotiations, so factfinding should be limited | Statutory text contains no MOU-limiting language; analogous EERA/HEERA practice applies factfinding to any bargaining impasse; legislative history and statutory purpose support broad application | Factfinding provisions apply to impasses over any negotiable term or condition of employment, not only MOU negotiations |
| Whether PERB’s interpretation is entitled to deference | Commission argued PERB’s decisions were post-hoc and created for litigation; thus should not be deferred to | PERB is the expert administrative agency for MMBA interpretation and its consistent practice merits deference absent clear error | Court deferred to PERB’s expertise; PERB’s interpretation was not clearly erroneous |
| Whether statutory phrases ("any applicable" mediation/factfinding; prohibition on implementing an MOU upon unilateral implementation) limit factfinding scope | These phrases show Legislature meant factfinding only for MOU bargaining | Phrases predate AB 646 or reflect procedural recognition that mediation/factfinding occur only when applicable; the MOU prohibition recognizes an MOU is a binding agreed product, not a limit on factfinding scope | Court found the language does not demonstrate a limiting intent and adopted PERB’s construction |
| Whether reliance on EERA/HEERA precedent is improper because procedural differences exist | Procedural distinctions (who may initiate mediation/factfinding, who pays) show the statutes differ materially, so precedent is inapposite | Differences are not material to what may be submitted to factfinding ("parties' differences"); long-standing analogous application supports similar construction | Court held the analogous schemes and PERB practice support applying MMBA factfinding to all bargaining impasses |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com., 56 Cal.4th 905 (discussion of PERB authority and MMBA context)
- International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188 v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 51 Cal.4th 259 (scope of duty to bargain; when management decisions are bargainable)
- Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers' Assn., Inc. v. County of Santa Clara, 224 Cal.App.4th 1016 (statutory interpretation and review of PERB determinations)
- Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal.3d 22 (MMBA pre-AB 646 impasse procedures and unilateral implementation)
- Mays v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal.4th 313 (statutory construction principles; choosing construction that fits legislative purpose)