San Diego Cnty. Health & Human Servs. Agency v. E.A. (In re E.A.), 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 346

Background

Two U.S.-citizen sisters (14 and 11) were removed from parents in Tijuana after Mexican child-protection agency (DIF) found them living in an abandoned house with no potable water, electricity, or adequate food; parents were using drugs and had not engaged with reunification services.
DIF sheltered the children; parents failed to participate in evaluations or visit and were effectively absent for months.
San Diego County Health and Human Services (Agency) filed dependency petitions under Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(g) (abandonment/related grounds) and detained the children with their maternal grandmother in the U.S.
At the Allen M. hearing, the juvenile court found the children had been left without provision for support but concluded § 300(g)’s last clause (child left with a willing relative) “trumped” the first clause and dismissed the petitions.
The Agency conceded the juvenile court misinterpreted § 300(g) on appeal but argued the error was harmless; minors argued dismissal was improper and the court also failed to consider other bases for dependency (e.g., neglect under § 300(b)(1)) per Allen M. principles.
The appellate court reversed, holding the trial court erred in statutory interpretation and in failing to assess dismissal under the totality of the evidence (Allen M.), and directed denial of the Agency’s motion to dismiss.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the juvenile court correctly interpret § 300(g) when it treated the clause about a willing relative as an exception that defeats the first clause (left without provision for support)?	Minors/Agency: § 300(g) contains alternative, disjunctive criteria; a finding under the first clause is sufficient for jurisdiction and is not trumped by the last clause.	Father/Mother: The court’s reading is correct; living with a willing relative means § 300(g) should not apply.	Reversed: The clauses are disjunctive alternatives. The court erred in treating the last clause as an exception to the first.
Was the court’s error harmless because the children were safe with grandmother and parents showed no present ability or intent to remove them?	Minors: Dismissal risked return to parents’ neglect; dismissal is not harmless.	Agency/Father/Mother: Grandmother’s care made the error harmless; parents won’t remove children.	Reversed: Error prejudicial — dismissal exposed children to substantial risk and the record shows the court dismissed only because of its statutory mistake.
Did the juvenile court violate Allen M. by failing to evaluate whether dismissal was in the minors’ welfare considering all possible bases for dependency (e.g., § 300(b)(1) neglect)?	Minors/Agency: Allen M. requires the court to decide if dismissal serves the child’s welfare based on totality of evidence, not limited to the narrow statutory ground pleaded.	Father/Agency/Mother: Court reasonably limited inquiry to § 300(g); grandmother’s care made Allen M. error harmless.	Reversed: Court must consider the child’s welfare and all relevant dependency grounds before dismissing; here it refused to consider § 300(b)(1) evidence and erred.
Remedy: Should the matter be remanded for further factfinding or simply deny dismissal?	Minors: Deny dismissal given existing findings of abandonment and risk.	Agency: (conceded error but urged harmlessness)	Court ordered reversal of dismissal and directed entry of orders denying the Agency’s motion to dismiss; remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion.

Key Cases Cited

Allen M. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.App.4th 1069 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (when agency seeks dismissal over a child’s objection, court must determine whether dismissal serves the child’s welfare and interests of justice)
In re C.H., 53 Cal.4th 94 (Cal. 2011) (statutory interpretation principles; begin with text and ordinary meaning)
In re B.D., 156 Cal.App.4th 975 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (welfare of the minor is the juvenile court’s paramount concern)
Aaron S. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal.App.3d 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (§ 300(g) is written in the disjunctive; parent-arranged care can preclude § 300(g) application)
In re J.O., 178 Cal.App.4th 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (evidence of past inability to care is probative of current ability)