5 F.4th 362
3d Cir.2021Background
- Defendant Samuel Randolph was initially represented by court-appointed counsel Allen Welch; their relationship deteriorated over preparation, communication, and strategy disagreements.
- Week before trial Randolph obtained funds and retained private counsel Samuel Stretton; Stretton entered his appearance and moved for continuances (one month, then a few days, then a three-hour delay of jury selection).
- The state trial court denied all continuance requests, refused Stretton’s entry when he did not appear at the scheduled jury-selection start time, and proceeded with jury selection under Welch; Randolph was convicted on all counts and sentenced to death.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance and noting defendant’s purported delay in seeking private counsel.
- On federal habeas review the District Court found the state court’s application of Sixth Amendment law objectively unreasonable, concluded Randolph’s right to counsel of choice was violated (structural error), granted habeas relief, and ordered retrial or release.
- The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court: the trial court’s refusal to accommodate Stretton’s modest request violated the Sixth Amendment; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of a short continuance and refusal to allow retained counsel to participate violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice | Randolph: counsel-of-choice presumption; severe breakdown with appointed counsel; requested only a short (three-hour) delay at a critical stage (voir dire); state offered no sufficient countervailing justification | Commonwealth: defendant delayed; continuance would impede efficient administration; Stretton failed to appear; concerns about funding and witness tampering; waiver/forfeiture alternative | Held: Violation. Denial was unreasonable under Supreme Court precedents; Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law; error is structural and not subject to harmless-error review. Habeas relief affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (defendant should have fair opportunity to secure counsel of choice)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed counsel for serious crimes)
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (unreasonable insistence on expedition can violate right to counsel)
- Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (trial judge has latitude balancing counsel-of-choice right against trial administration)
- Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (limits on counsel-of-choice for conflicts or other disqualifying reasons)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (erroneous denial of counsel of choice is structural error)
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (death-qualified jury considerations during voir dire)
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (limitations on juror views about death penalty and exclusion)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standards for state-court decisions)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for overturning state-court factual findings on habeas)