242 F. Supp. 3d 496
N.D. Miss.2017Background
- Scott Samsel was Olive Branch High School’s athletic director and head football coach; he was removed from those supplemental positions in January 2014 and later not rehired.
- Samsel’s employment included a teaching contract and supplemental (coaching/AD) contracts that permitted cancellation on two weeks’ notice.
- Principal Allyson Killough led the decision to remove Samsel as AD/coach after reports of misconduct, complaints from assistants, and perceived attempts by Samsel to marshal community opposition to her leadership; Superintendent Milton Kuykendall supported removal and later forwarded an email endorsing accusations that an OBHS coach had stolen from the school.
- Samsel asserted federal claims (ADEA age discrimination; First Amendment retaliation; Fourteenth Amendment due process) and state tort claims (tortious interference, defamation) arising from his firing and the district’s refusal to rehire him.
- The district defendants moved for summary judgment; the court granted summary judgment for defendants on all federal claims and most state claims but denied summary judgment on Samsel’s defamation claim against Kuykendall, finding triable issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADEA age discrimination (but‑for causation) | Samsel contends Killough’s references to difficulty relating to “younger” coaches and hiring younger replacements show age animus. | Defendants point to performance issues, insubordination, and local politics; replacement pattern and evidence do not show age as but‑for cause. | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to show age was the but‑for cause; record shows legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. |
| First Amendment retaliation (speech/association) | Samsel alleges protected speech/associational activity (statements to team, to mayor, and ties to social‑media posters) motivated firing. | Defendants argue speech was pursuant to job duties or personal insubordination, not public‑concern speech; Jones precedent requires specificity and no recovery for perceived but unmade speech. | Dismissed: speech was not protected (Garcetti/Pickering/Connick); plaintiff failed to identify specific protected activity and causation. |
| Fourteenth Amendment procedural/substantive due process (property/liberty interest) | Samsel asserts a property interest in his coaching/AD roles and claims defendants acted arbitrarily or with malicious interference. | Defendants rely on at‑will supplemental contracts allowing cancellation with two weeks’ notice and that plaintiff received notice; also no conscience‑shocking conduct for substantive due process. | Dismissed: no protected property interest in supplemental contracts; procedural and substantive due process claims fail. |
| Tortious interference with contract (state law) | Samsel contends Killough and Kuykendall maliciously interfered to terminate his supplemental contracts. | Defendants contend actions were within official duties and lacked the malice/intent required under Mississippi law. | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to raise triable facts showing requisite malice or unlawful purpose. |
| Failure to rehire / retaliation for seeking reinstatement | Samsel demanded reinstatement when position reopened and sued after refusal. | Defendants argue they lawfully declined and had no obligation to reinstate absent a favorable judgment; Ford Motor incentives discussed. | Dismissed: no factual or legal basis to compel reinstatement; claims lack merit. |
| Defamation (Kuykendall forwarding email) | Samsel says Kuykendall’s forwarding (and endorsing) an email that repeated that a coach had stolen money referred to Samsel, was published widely, and was made with at least negligence or reckless disregard. | Defendants invoke qualified privilege and CDA §230 immunity for forwarding third‑party content. | Denied as to Kuykendall: triable issues exist whether the superintendent’s endorsement/transmission added defamatory content, whether he abused any privilege, and whether CDA immunity applies to his conduct. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2010) (explains McDonnell Douglas framework and ADEA burden shifting for circumstantial evidence)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (ADEA requires plaintiff prove age was the but‑for cause)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (public employee speech pursuant to official duties is not First Amendment protected)
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (balancing employee speech on matters of public concern against employer’s interest in efficient operations)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (framework for assessing public‑concern speech and Pickering balancing)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (U.S. 1993) (clarifies ADEA protects against stereotypical age‑based assumptions, not all age‑correlated decisions)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1977) (mixed‑motive burden shifting in First Amendment retaliation cases)
- Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998) (Fifth Circuit rule that retaliation based on a perceived but unmade protected statement is not actionable)
- Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (U.S. 1976) (damage to reputation alone does not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment liberty deprivation)