Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150

Background

Gary Lee Sampson pled guilty to two counts of carjacking resulting in death; a jury after a penalty-phase recommended death and the court sentenced him to death.
Sampson filed a §2255 motion alleging three jurors (C, D, G) lied in voir dire; the district court held an evidentiary hearing and found Juror C intentionally lied about material facts (her ex-husband’s abuse/substance problems and an adult daughter’s criminal history and drug use).
The district court concluded Juror C’s dishonesty would have led to excusal for cause and vacated the death sentence, ordering a new penalty-phase hearing; it certified legal questions under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).
The government sought immediate appellate review via final-order appeal, §1292(b) interlocutory appeal, and advisory mandamus; the First Circuit rejected final-order and CAA routes as foreclosed by Andrews v. United States.
The First Circuit exercised advisory mandamus to decide the merits, rejecting the district court’s categorical sub-classification of bias but accepting its factual findings and holding McDonough’s two-part test was satisfied as to Juror C.
The court vacated the death sentence and affirmed the need for a new penalty-phase hearing because Juror C’s repeated, intentional dishonesty, strong emotional impairment, and close factual parallels to penalty-phase evidence established bias sufficient for excusal.

Issues

Issue	Government's Argument	Sampson's Argument	Held
Was the district court order vacating sentence and ordering a new penalty-phase hearing immediately appealable as a final order?	Order is final or is equivalent to granting a new trial and thus appealable (and CAA applies).	Andrews controls: not final until resentencing; not immediately appealable.	Not final under Andrews; appeal as final order and via CAA denied.
Could the court hear interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)?	§1292(b) certification proper and should be allowed.	§1292(b) is limited to civil actions; unclear if §2255 is civil; interlocutory route questionable.	Court declined to resolve §1292(b) applicability; instead exercised advisory mandamus.
Was advisory mandamus appropriate to address the juror-dishonesty question now?	Government opposed extraordinary relief as unnecessary.	Sampson: review needed because issue might evade later review and is recurring/systemic.	Advisory mandamus appropriate given likelihood issue would evade meaningful review and systemic importance.
Did juror dishonesty require vacatur under McDonough? (Legal standard and application)	District court misread McDonough; required actual or implied bias; relief should be limited.	Juror C’s deliberate false answers to material voir dire questions and the totality of circumstances meet McDonough’s two-part test.	McDonough’s two-part test applies: (1) juror failed to answer honestly a material question; (2) truthful answer would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause. Both satisfied for Juror C; sentence vacated.

Key Cases Cited

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (establishes two-part test for juror dishonesty: dishonest material answer + truthful answer would justify challenge for cause)
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963) (holding a §2255 order vacating a sentence and ordering resentencing is not a final appealable order)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (even a single biased juror in death penalty context invalidates death sentence)
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (emphasizes the constitutional importance of an impartial jury)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (non-retroactivity framework for new constitutional rules in collateral review)
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (definition of an impartial juror: capable and willing to decide case solely on evidence)
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (addressing consequences when biased juror participates in capital sentencing)