Sammie Caston v. State, 549 S.W.3d 601

Defendant Sammie Caston was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child (TX Penal Code §21.02(b)) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The complainant (T.H.) was born in 2003 and reported repeated sexual abuse beginning when she was eight.
Alleged acts included digital and oral contact and attempted intercourse occurring after Caston moved in with the victim’s mother in late 2010; medical records and the child’s testimony were admitted.
The State sought and the trial court admitted extraneous-offense evidence under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 §2(b) that Caston also sexually abused his daughter S.C.; a pre‑trial §2‑a hearing was held and the court found the extraneous testimony adequate to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defense challenged §2(b) as unconstitutional under the federal due process clause and argued S.C.’s testimony should be excluded under Tex. R. Evid. 403 as unfairly prejudicial.
Defendant also challenged sufficiency of the evidence that he was at least 17 at the times of the charged acts; the record showed he was born in 1977 and the offenses occurred in 2010–2011.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: (1) §38.37 §2(b) does not violate due process and the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting S.C.’s testimony; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s age element.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Caston)	Held
Whether Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 §2(b) (admission of extraneous child‑sexual‑offense evidence against non‑complainant children) violates federal due process	§2(b) is a permissible legislative evidentiary rule that addresses unique difficulties in child‑sexual‑abuse prosecutions and includes safeguards (notice, §2‑a hearing, Rule 403 balancing) so it is constitutional	§2(b) permits propensity/character evidence that infringes a substantive due process right to a trial free from such propensity evidence and is therefore unconstitutional	Section 2(b) is constitutional; procedural safeguards and Rule 403 preserve a fair trial; appellate precedent supports constitutionality
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Caston was at least 17 when the charged acts occurred (an element of continuous sexual abuse)	Birthyear evidence (1977) and timeline of abuse (2010–2011) established defendant was well over 17 during the charged period	Argued State failed to prove he was ≥17 at the times of the acts	Evidence (birth year + timing) was sufficient for a rational jury to find defendant ≥17 for each act; sufficiency challenge overruled

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (views on sufficiency of the evidence standard)
United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding constitutionality of Federal Rule admitting prior sexual‑offense evidence)
United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (Rule allowing propensity evidence for sexual offenses is not fundamentally unfair when Rule 403 protections apply)
United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (Congress may create exceptions to exclusionary practice for prior sexual offenses)
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. Crim. App.) (recognizing the special evidentiary issues in sexual‑assault cases)
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App.) (factors for Rule 403 balancing)
Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.—Austin) (extraneous child‑abuse evidence relevant and admissible)
Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.—Tyler) (upholding §38.37 §2(b) and explaining statutory safeguards)