Samaripas, David Jr., PD-0626-15

David Samaripas Jr. was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity with a deadly-weapon finding and sentenced as a habitual offender to 53 years.
Appellant raised multiple issues on appeal; the Court of Criminal Appeals narrowed review to (1) whether voir dire error was preserved and (2) whether a prior state jail felony could be used to enhance his sentence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals on preservation of the voir dire complaint and remanded for consideration of the merits of that issue; it agreed the enhancement was proper.
At trial, defense counsel asked a prospective juror: “What type of evidence do you expect the State of Texas to bring you…to prove beyond a reasonable doubt…?” The State objected as an improper commitment question and the trial court sustained the objection and required rephrasing.
The court of appeals on remand held the question was a commitment question that invited jurors to set hypothetical evidentiary prerequisites for conviction; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection.
Even assuming error, the court concluded any exclusion was non-constitutional and harmless under Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) given the strength of the evidence, alternate voir dire questioning, the jury charge, and the record as a whole.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel's voir dire question about the "type of evidence" jurors would expect to convict	Samaripas: the question was proper (not an improper commitment question); it probed jurors' understanding of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and was necessary to preserve a challenge for cause and intelligent use of peremptories	State: the question was an improper commitment question that would bind jurors to evidentiary prerequisites the law does not require; court properly sustained objection	Court: question was a commitment question inviting jurors to set hypothetical evidentiary prerequisites and did not target a valid challenge for cause; no abuse of discretion in exclusion
If exclusion was error, whether it requires reversal (harm analysis)	Samaripas: exclusion prejudiced his ability to challenge jurors and affected substantial rights	State: any limitation was not constitutionally significant; defense still could explore reasonable-doubt understanding by other methods and the record supports harmlessness	Court: any error was non-constitutional and harmless under Rule 44.2(b); evidence against Samaripas was strong and alternate voir dire, instructions, and record show no substantial effect on verdict

Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (defines improper commitment questions that bind jurors to verdicts based on hypotheticals)
Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court abuses discretion only when a proper question about a proper area of inquiry is prohibited)
Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (two-step test for commitment questions; question is improper unless one possible answer gives rise to a valid challenge for cause)
Gonzales v. State, 994 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (erroneous exclusion of proper voir dire question is subject to harmless-error analysis)
Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (distinguishes constitutional voir dire error from non-constitutional and prescribes Rule 44.2(b) review when other voir dire avenues remain)
Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (definition and application of substantial-rights harmless-error standard under Rule 44.2(b))
Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (defining elements of engaging in organized criminal activity)
Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (conviction may rest on testimony of a single eyewitness)