155 F.4th 578
6th Cir.2025Background
- Samantha Graf, an ER technician, alleged a security guard (Thomas Ogle) raped her in a hospital security office while she was on break; Ogle contended the encounter was consensual role-play.
- Graf reported the incident internally weeks later; Ogle was terminated by his employer (SBSI) after admitting to sex with Graf and others. MHHA’s HR reviewed the matter and then terminated Graf for having sex while on the clock and in an unauthorized area.
- Graf sued MHHA (and SBSI, later dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds) asserting Title VII and THRA retaliation, and state tort claims; most claims were dismissed on summary judgment except retaliation and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress (later narrowed).
- Prior to trial MHHA moved under Fed. R. Evid. 412 to admit evidence of Graf’s sexual communications with Ogle (explicit photos/videos, BDSM references) and other sexual-history evidence; the district court allowed limited evidence of communications with Ogle (photos admissible, videos not) but excluded other private communications.
- Trial centered on whether Graf reasonably and in good faith believed the encounter was nonconsensual (the protected activity element of a Title VII retaliation claim); the jury found for MHHA and judgment was entered against Graf.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Title VII retaliation plaintiff who reports sexual assault must prove she had a reasonable and good‑faith belief that the conduct was unlawful | Graf: No; when a report is plainly a rape, no additional inquiry into plaintiff’s belief is required | MHHA: Yes; retaliation protection requires the plaintiff held an objectively reasonable and good‑faith belief that the reported conduct was unlawful | Court: Affirmed; plaintiff must prove she reasonably and in good faith believed the conduct violated Title VII (i.e., that she was raped) |
| Whether employer could introduce evidence that the plaintiff consented to the complained‑of encounter (communications with the alleged assailant) despite Rule 412 | Graf: Such evidence is highly prejudicial and barred by Rule 412 | MHHA: Communications with Ogle are intrinsic to the alleged misconduct and directly relevant to rebut Graf’s reasonable/good‑faith belief and consent | Court: Affirmed limited admission; communications with Ogle (including some explicit photos) fell outside Rule 412’s ‘‘other sexual behavior’’ ban and were admissible for narrow relevance to consent/belief |
| Admission of sexual‑history/predisposition evidence beyond communications with Ogle (reputation, other encounters, BDSM references to others) | Graf: District court failed to apply Rule 412(b)(2)’s stringent balancing test; such evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant | MHHA: Certain background/past‑relationship evidence was probative of credibility and belief; much proffered evidence was appropriately excluded or limited | Court: Affirmed; court correctly excluded communications with others and limited evidence to narrow non‑propensity use; no reversible abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1989) (opposition conduct requires a good‑faith belief that practice is unlawful)
- Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claimant must have a reasonable and good‑faith belief that opposed practices were unlawful)
- Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff must have a reasonable and good‑faith belief that reported conduct was a Title VII violation)
- Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2014) (focus on whether complained conduct could reasonably be believed to be unlawful)
- Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, 828 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2016) (objective inquiry into plaintiff’s reasonable and good‑faith belief)
- Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 858 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 2017) (opposition clause does not protect knowingly false allegations)
- Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2002) (statements about one’s own sexual history/preferences can be intrinsic and outside Rule 412’s ‘‘other sexual behavior’’ exclusion)