Salveson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
20-2658
| 2d Cir. | Jun 29, 2021Background
- Plaintiffs (Melvin Salveson and others) are Mastercard/Visa cardholders who sued major banks alleging a §1 Sherman Act and California Cartwright Act conspiracy to fix interchange fees charged in card transactions.
- The district court dismissed the complaint in 2014; a 2016 reconsideration ruling and this Court’s 2016 summary affirmation left a final judgment against plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) seeking relief from the final judgment after the Supreme Court decided Ohio v. American Express (2018) and Apple Inc. v. Pepper (2019), arguing those decisions changed the law on antitrust standing and direct-purchaser status.
- Central legal question: whether cardholders are "direct purchasers" of interchange fees (so not barred by Illinois Brick) or whether interchange fees are passed among financial institutions such that cardholders lack standing to recover damages.
- The district court denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief, concluding American Express and Apple did not undermine the prior finding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege they directly paid interchange fees.
- The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief was not an abuse of discretion because the intervening decisions did not entitle plaintiffs to relief or change the Illinois Brick analysis for these plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted based on intervening Supreme Court decisions | American Express and Apple changed decisional law so failing to reopen would produce inconsistent results and constitute extraordinary circumstances | The intervening rulings do not alter that plaintiffs did not plausibly allege direct payment of interchange fees; no extraordinary circumstance | Denied — no abuse of discretion; intervening decisions did not justify reopening judgment |
| Whether cardholders are "direct purchasers" under Illinois Brick (i.e., paid interchange fees directly) | Cardholders participate in a two-sided market and therefore effectively "purchase transactions" and pay interchange fees | Interchange fees are paid between financial institutions/merchants; cardholders do not directly pay interchange fees | Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege direct payment; Illinois Brick bars their antitrust damages claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (two-sided market analysis for credit-card networks; provides market-definition framework but does not decide antitrust standing under Illinois Brick)
- Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (consumers who bought apps directly from Apple were direct purchasers not barred by Illinois Brick)
- Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (direct-purchaser rule barring downstream plaintiffs from recovering antitrust damages)
- In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2013) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief available only in extraordinary circumstances)
