Salvatore Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc.(075171)
141 A.3d 1187
| N.J. | 2016Background
- Puglia was a unionized laborer covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) working on a Camden public-works project subject to New Jersey’s Prevailing Wage Act.
- In January 2010 Puglia’s hourly rate was cut (allegedly by placing him in an unapproved apprenticeship); he and co-workers complained to supervisors and Elk’s president and later to the resident engineer, who found payroll violations.
- Elk restored prevailing wages and paid back pay in September 2010, but Puglia disputed the sufficiency of his back pay and continued to protest.
- Puglia was laid off in December 2010; Elk says layoffs were due to project winding down and needed skills/certifications of other laborers despite Puglia’s greater seniority.
- Puglia sued under CEPA (whistleblower retaliation); Prevailing Wage claim was settled and dismissed. Trial court and Appellate Division held CEPA claim preempted by federal labor law; the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LMRA §301 preempts Puglia’s CEPA retaliatory-discharge claim | Puglia: CEPA is an independent statutory claim that can be decided by state courts without interpreting CBA terms; any CBA overlap is factual, not legal, and Puglia will abandon reliance on the CBA seniority provision at trial | Elk: The claim necessarily depends on CBA terms (seniority/layoff rules); CBA-based defenses require interpretation of the agreement and thus preemption | Not preempted: CEPA claim does not require interpretation of the CBA; employer’s CBA-based defense alone cannot convert the claim into a §301 action (Lingle/Caterpillar/Hawaiian framework) |
| Whether NLRA (Garmon) preempts the CEPA claim because complaints were concerted activity | Puglia: His complaints were whistleblowing about statutory wage violations, not protected concerted activity to advance collective bargaining; CEPA enforces a generally applicable minimum-labor standard | Elk: Joint complaints and group discussion over wages constitute concerted activity under §7; alleged retaliatory discharge thus implicates §8 and must go to the NLRB | Not preempted: Although conduct was arguably concerted, the CEPA claim’s proofs (whistleblowing + retaliatory motive) differ from an NLRA unfair-labor-practice case; allowing the CEPA suit would only minimally interfere with NLRB primary jurisdiction and furthers state interest in enforcing wage/anti-retaliation law |
| Effect of plaintiff’s factual references to seniority in complaint/deposition | Puglia: References to seniority are factual background and not a claim for CBA breach; plaintiff will not rely on seniority in his case-in-chief | Elk: Those references mean the CEPA claim is intertwined with the CBA and thus preempted | Court: References to seniority do not transform the CEPA claim into a CBA-based claim; plaintiff bound by concession to abandon reliance on seniority rights at trial |
| Whether permitting CEPA suits for retaliation over prevailing-wage complaints would undermine federal labor scheme | Puglia/NJAJ: CEPA enforces minimum labor protections equally for union/nonunion workers; barring CEPA remedies would leave statutes toothless | Elk/EANJ: NLRB is the appropriate forum for disputes implicating union-rights and concerted activities | Court: State interest in enforcing minimum wage statutes and anti-retaliation (CEPA) outweighs de minimis interference; preemption would produce hollow remedies for workers |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (§301 preemption applies only when resolution of the state-law claim requires interpreting the CBA)
- San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state regulation must yield when conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA)
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (refines Garmon by comparing the forum-specific controversies and focusing on interference with NLRB primary jurisdiction)
- Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (state minimum labor standards affecting union and nonunion employees are generally not preempted by the NLRA)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (a federal defense based on a CBA does not by itself convert a state-law claim into a §301 claim for removal; distinction between defensive federal questions and preemption)
- Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) (reiterates that retaliatory discharge claims can be purely factual and survive §301 preemption when they do not require CBA interpretation)