Salvador Gonzalez-Vega v. Loretta E. Lynch
839 F.3d 738
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Gonzalez-Vega, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2004 and conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
- He sought administrative closure of his removal proceedings because his U.S.-born son (born Jan. 2014) could potentially sponsor him for a visa when the son turns 21.
- The IJ denied administrative closure, emphasizing that the anticipated closure would last roughly two decades (until the son turns 21) and no visa petition was pending, making the duration indefinite.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial but did not address Gonzalez-Vega’s alternative request that the BIA itself exercise independent authority to administratively close the case.
- Gonzalez-Vega appealed to the Eighth Circuit, challenging the denial and arguing the BIA failed to rule on its independent-authority request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review denial of administrative closure | Avetisyan supplies a workable standard, so denial is reviewable | Prior precedent (Hernandez/Diallo) left denials unreviewable | Court held denials are reviewable under abuse-of-discretion standard, relying on Avetisyan's factors |
| Whether the IJ abused discretion in denying administrative closure | IJ should have granted closure pending possible visa sponsorship when son turns 21 | IJ reasonably denied closure because anticipated duration (~20 years) and no pending application made closure indefinite | Court affirmed IJ; no abuse of discretion in weighing long anticipated duration and remoteness of relief |
| Whether the BIA adequately considered and ruled on Gonzalez-Vega’s request that the BIA itself grant administrative closure | BIA failed to address petitioner’s independent-request and thus abused discretion | Government contends BIA implicitly rejected it or found arguments not raised below | Court remanded for BIA to explicitly consider and rule on the independent-request |
| Standard of review for denial of administrative closure | Abuse of discretion; BIA must show it "heard and thought" the issues | Same; BIA contends IJ and BIA applied discretion appropriately | Court applies abuse-of-discretion standard and requires adequate explanation to permit review |
Key Cases Cited
- Hernandez v. Holder, 606 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010) (earlier holding that denials of administrative closure were unreviewable)
- Diallo v. Holder, 715 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2013) (addressed administrative-closure denial post-Avetisyan without discussing Avetisyan)
- Santos-Amaya v. Holder, [citation="544 F. App'x 209"] (4th Cir. 2013) (circuit court review of administrative-closure denial)
- Duruji v. Lynch, [citation="630 F. App'x 589"] (6th Cir. 2015) (same)
- Habchy v. Filip, 552 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard for BIA abuse of discretion)
- Omondi v. Holder, 674 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (BIA must explain decisions sufficiently to permit judicial review)
- Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2013) (review of IJ decisions where BIA adopts IJ reasoning)
- Clifton v. Holder, 598 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2010) (BIA’s favorable exercise-of-discretion standard)