112 So. 3d 772
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013Background
- Saltzman appeals after the trial court denied his motion for attorney’s fees against Hadlock.
- Hadlock filed a medical malpractice suit against Saltzman and went to arbitration, which found no negligence by Saltzman.
- Hadlock pursued a jury trial de novo under § 44.103(5) and Rule 1.820(h); the jury sided with Saltzman, resulting in a final judgment for Saltzman.
- Saltzman moved for attorney’s fees under § 44.103(6), which the trial court denied.
- The issue is whether § 44.103(6) mandates or allows, on the outcome of trial versus arbitration, an award of fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 44.103(6) discretionary or mandatory? | Saltzman argues the word 'may' creates discretion only on comparing judgments, not fee eligibility. | Hadlock argues the statute’s 'may' should be read to confer mandatory ability to award fees when outcome is not more favorable than arbitration. | Discretionary; court may award or deny fees. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daniels v. Florida Department of Health, 898 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2005) (clear statutory language controls when unambiguous)
- Fla. Bar v. Trazenfeld, 833 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2002) (‘may’ denotes permissive, not mandatory)
- Humane Soc’y of Broward Cnty., Inc. v. Fla. Humane Soc’y., 951 So.2d 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (award of attorney’s fees discretionary under a similar statute)
- Williams v. Fla. Mem'l. Coll, 453 So.2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (statutes authorize, but do not require, fee awards)
- Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests., LLC v. 330545 Donuts, Inc., 27 So.3d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (statutory purpose to discourage miscalculation; discretionary award)
- Bevan v. Bean, 661 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (applies former statutory language when action accrues)