Salt Lake City Corporation v. Haik, 334 P.3d 490

Background

In April 2012 Mark Haik submitted a GRAMA request to Salt Lake City for documents (Opinion Letters) reflecting outside counsel’s review and advice about City water‑exchange agreements from the 1990s.
The City refused disclosure, citing GRAMA exemptions for attorney–client privileged materials, attorney work product, and records concerning litigation strategy, but its denial letter miscited statutory section numbers.
Haik appealed to the Salt Lake City Records Appeals Board (the Board); the Board found the City’s statutory citations were incorrect and that the City had not properly supported withholding under the cited provisions.
The City petitioned the district court for judicial review; it submitted affidavits from the City’s director and the attorney stating the reviews were in response to threats of litigation and contained legal theories and advice for anticipated litigation.
The district court held it had jurisdiction, overruled Haik’s evidentiary objections, conducted an in camera review, and granted summary judgment for the City, finding the Opinion Letters protected as attorney work product (and alternatively under revised GRAMA attorney‑client privilege language).
Haik appealed, raising jurisdictional, statutory‑interpretation, evidentiary, and fact‑dispute arguments; the Court of Appeals affirms.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Haik)	Defendant's Argument (City)	Held
Did the district court have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision?	Only a "requester" may seek judicial review; City lacked standing to appeal.	GRAMA and the City ordinance allow any party to an appeals board proceeding to petition for judicial review, including the City.	Court: District court had jurisdiction; political subdivisions may seek judicial review of appeals board decisions.
Was the City’s denial letter insufficient because it miscited GRAMA sections?	The inaccurate statutory citations meant the notice failed GRAMA §63G-2-205 requirements.	The letter substantively identified the exemptions relied on (attorney work product, privilege, litigation strategy); substantial compliance sufficed and Haik suffered no prejudice.	Court: Substantial compliance is enough here; the letter adequately put Haik on notice.
Are the withheld Opinion Letters protected from disclosure under GRAMA?	The letters were routine contract reviews, not prepared solely in anticipation of litigation, so not exempt.	Affidavits and in camera review show letters contain attorney mental impressions, legal theories and advice prepared in response to threats of litigation — attorney work product (and thus exempt).	Court: Letters are protected attorney work product under GRAMA §63G-2-305(17) (2011); alternative 2012 privilege change not necessary.
Did material factual disputes preclude summary judgment?	Payment and billing records show primary purpose was contract review, creating factual issues about intent and anticipation of litigation.	The affidavits and documentary record show reviews were prompted by litigation threats and contained legal strategy/opinions.	Court: No genuine disputed material fact; affidavits and documents support that letters were prepared in anticipation of litigation.

Key Cases Cited

Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (standard of review for summary judgment and viewing facts for nonmovant)
Berneau v. Martino, 223 P.3d 1128 (Utah 2009) (statutory interpretation principles; read provisions harmoniously)
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 200 P.3d 643 (Utah 2008) (party asserting work‑product exemption must show document prepared in anticipation of litigation)
Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail v. Third Dist. Court, 156 P.3d 801 (Utah 2007) (distinguishing when statutory language requires strict versus substantial compliance)
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) (one sworn statement can create factual dispute to defeat summary judgment)