Sallah v. Ujas Barstow, LLC CA4/1, D075874

James D. Sallah, the court-appointed monitor for defrauded investors in a Florida hedge-fund matter, sued three related California entities for promissory fraud based on a $930,000 promissory note dated January 4, 2013.
The note (Columbia Downtown, LLC) promised repayment plus an origination fee by February 28, 2013; OM Global wired $930,000 to Chhatrala Barstow (later Ujas Barstow, LLC); no repayment was made.
Sallah alleges the entities never intended to repay when they executed the note and later planned to assert forgery/unauthorization defenses; he also pleads later false assurances made during settlement talks as circumstantial evidence of intent.
Defendants moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the fraud claim arises from protected settlement statements and is barred (or insulated) by litigation privilege; they alternatively claimed the note was a forgery.
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motions, concluding the promissory-fraud cause of action is based on a false promise at the time of execution and that later settlement statements are merely evidentiary.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding defendants failed to show the claim arose from protected activity because the essential elements of promissory fraud depend on intent at the time of the promise, not later settlement statements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the promissory-fraud cause of action "arises from" protected activity for anti-SLAPP purposes	Sallah: claim is based on a false promise when the note was executed; later settlement statements are only circumstantial evidence of preexisting intent	Defendants: the SAC rests on false assurances made during settlement negotiations, so the claim arises from protected litigation-related speech and should be struck	Held: Anti-SLAPP does not apply; claim is founded on the false promise at execution and later statements are evidentiary only, so defendants failed their initial burden
Whether Sallah established minimal merit to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion	Sallah: alleged facts and subsequent conduct provide circumstantial proof of intent not to perform	Defendants: Sallah offered no admissible evidence; later statements are privileged	Held: Court did not reach this issue because defendants failed prong one (motion denied on that basis)

Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (2017) (distinguishes activity that forms the basis of a claim from activity that merely provides evidentiary support for the claim)
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (2019) (sets framework for anti-SLAPP burdens and first-prong analysis)
Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (anti-SLAPP creates a summary-judgment-like early procedural test)
Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (2002) (cause of action arises from protected activity only when the activity underlies the claim)
Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 39 Cal.3d 18 (1985) (promissory fraud requires more than nonperformance; courts may look to circumstantial evidence of intent)
Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631 (1996) (elements of fraud include misrepresentation, scienter, reliance, and damages)
Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn., 55 Cal.4th 1169 (2013) (intent element in promissory fraud entails more than a mere failure to perform)
Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, 181 Cal.App.4th 1207 (2010) (distinguishes speech that provides evidence of liability from speech that forms the basis of liability)
Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, 18 Cal.App.5th 95 (2017) (statutory protection extends to statements made in settlement negotiations)