Sali ex rel. Themselves v. Corona Reg'l Med. Ctr.
909 F.3d 996
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Plaintiffs Marlyn Sali and Deborah Spriggs (RNs) sued Corona Regional Medical Center and UHS of Delaware, Inc., alleging multiple California wage-and-hour violations and sought to certify seven putative classes of RNs (rounding-time, short-shift, meal-period, rest-break, regular-rate, wage-statement, waiting-time).
- Corona used an electronic timekeeping system that rounded clock-in/out times to the nearest quarter hour; plaintiffs allege the rounding practice systematically underpaid RNs.
- The district court denied class certification for multiple reasons: plaintiffs lacked admissible evidence of individual injuries (typicality), Spriggs was not an adequate representative, proposed class counsel were inadequate, and several classes failed Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.
- On appeal plaintiffs challenged denial of certification for the rounding-time, regular-rate, wage-statement, and waiting-time classes; the Ninth Circuit stayed proceedings earlier pending related California decisions.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of certification for the rounding-time, regular-rate, wage-statement, and waiting-time classes (except it agreed Spriggs was not a class member), holding the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence solely because it might be inadmissible and by misapplying California law on compensable time and §226 damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court may exclude evidence at class-cert stage as inadmissible | Sali argued the court may consider Ruiz (paralegal) analysis and plaintiffs’ declarations to show typicality; admissibility is not required at this preliminary stage | Corona argued Ruiz’s declaration and spreadsheets were inadmissible lay/expert testimony and unauthenticated hearsay | Court: Evidence need not be admissible at class-certification stage; striking Ruiz solely for inadmissibility was legal error and abused discretion |
| Whether named plaintiff Spriggs is an adequate class representative | Spriggs sought to represent classes including full‑time RNs | Corona noted Spriggs was not classified full‑time and thus not a class member | Court: Spriggs is not an adequate representative because she is not in the class she seeks to represent, but Sali remains adequate so certification need not fail for that reason |
| Whether proposed class counsel (Bisnar Chase) are adequate | Plaintiffs said counsel had substantial class-action experience and had litigated extensively | Corona and the district court pointed to counsel’s procedural lapses, missed depositions, sanctions, and problematic declarations | Court: District court prematurely found counsel inadequate; record shows substantial work and qualifications, though court may consider misconduct going forward |
| Whether individual issues predominate for rounding-time class under Rule 23(b)(3) | Plaintiffs: Rounding practice and employer control issues are amenable to class‑wide proof; See’s Candy/Cal. law allow class resolution of compensable time when employer control/systemic policy exists | Corona: Whether employees were “actually working” during grace periods is individualized (employees may be off‑task) so individualized proof predominates | Court: District court misinterpreted California law—compensable time includes time employees are under employer control; employer‑control questions are amenable to classwide proof; predominance analysis improperly focused on individualized activity and thus was erroneous |
| Whether individual issues predominate for wage-statement (§226) class | Plaintiffs: §226 violation (wrong employer name) causes per se injury where employee cannot promptly determine legal employer—amenable to class treatment | Corona: Each employee must prove they were damaged by each inaccurate paystub, creating individualized inquiries | Court: §226 creates a per se injury for failure to provide required employer identity; damages are statutory and uniform per violation, so individualized damage inquiries do not defeat predominance |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (class-cert requirements and rigorous analysis)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (predominance and damages must align with classwide proof)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (burden of proof varies by stage of litigation)
- Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (admissibility and weight of expert evidence at certification)
- Yokoyama v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087 (abuse-of-discretion standard for certification)
- Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 536 F.3d 975 (standard of review for class certification)
- In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679 (Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) prerequisites discussion)
- See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal.App.4th 889 (California law on permissible rounding policies)
- Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575 (California compensable-time and employer-control principles)
